We had earlier extensively covered the development involving anti-suit injunction granted by the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court and the anti-anti-suit injunction granted by the Delhi High Court with regard to the SEP dispute between InterDigital and Xiaomi (see here, here and here). As we could gather from here, InterDigital had filed an application before the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court to reconsider the anti-suit injunction granted in favour of Xiaomi. The application was, however, rejected by the Wuhan Court.
Update: Wuhan Court Rejects Application to Reconsider Anti-Suit Injunction Granted in Favour of Xiaomi
NFSI Panel Discussion on ‘TRIPS Waiver Proposal – State of Play and the Way Forward’ [December 18]
We’re pleased to inform you that an online panel discussion on ‘TRIPS Waiver Proposal – State of Play and the Way forward’ is being organised on 18th December at 7:30 PM IST. For registration and other details, please see the announcement below.
The discussion on the waiver proposal in an earlier two part post on the blog can be viewed here and here.
NFSI Panel Discussion on TRIPS Waiver Proposal – State of Play and the Way Forward’
December 18 | 7:30 PM IST
Please join us on Friday, 18th December 2020, for a panel discussion on ‘TRIPS Waiver Proposal – State of Play and the Way forward’ at 7.30 PM IST (3.00 PM CET).
Link for registration: bit.ly/nfsi4-TRIPS.
The discussion is being co-organized by Chinmaya Viswavidyapeeth, National Law University Delhi (NLUD), Inter-University Centre for IPR Studies (IUCIPRS), CUSAT & Third World Network (TWN).
Access to medicines and medical technologies has been a recurring concern across the globe, particularly in times of a pandemic. While Intellectual Property protection provides incentives to enable new research, it is also a major reason for inaccessibility of such technologies due to the existence of the global IP regime enforced through the TRIPS Agreement and/or various other international agreements. In response to the current COVID19 crisis, India along with South Africa, Kenya and Estwani approached the TRIPS council to waive obligations regarding the protection and enforcement of certain IP rights to enable the fight against the pandemic. While many developed countries expressed their scepticism on the proposal, it obtained wide support from WTO member countries, international organizations like WHO and UNAIDS, academia and social movements. Further deliberation on the proposal is going to take place in the TRIPS Council and General Counsel of WTO. Against this background, under the aegis of the 4th International Conference on ‘New Frontiers in Sanskrit and Indic Knowledge’, Chinmaya Viswavidyapeeth, along with NLUD, IUCIPRS-CUSAT & TWN is organizing a panel discussion to understand the imperativeness of the waiver proposal.
About the Conference
‘New Frontiers in Sanskrit and Indic Knowledge’ is the flagship annual International Conference organized by Chinmaya Vishwavidyapeeth. This year in its 4th edition, the conference is themed on ‘Law, Public Policy and Governance’ exploring and evaluating the Indian public policy and contemporary jurisprudence from the perspective of an indigenous. The conference is supported by the Indian Council of Historical Research, New Delhi. As part of the NFSI Working Group III on Arenas of New Knowledge Production and Indian Public Policy and Working Group IV on India as VishwaGuru- Indian Knowledge Systems and Preparing for the Global Future, the current panel is being organised due to the cross-cutting nature of issues around innovation, access and India’s strategic concerns.
Panelists
Prof. (Dr.) Biswajith Dhar
Centre for Economic Studies and Planning
School of Social Sciences, JNU
Former Member of the Board of Trade
Shri Mustaqeem de Gama
Counsellor, South Africa WTO Mission
Dr. HU Yuan Qiong, Ph.D.
Policy Co-coordinator
Senior Legal & Policy Advisor
Médecins Sans Frontières Access Campaign
Moderator
KM Gopakumar
Legal Advisor & Senior Researcher, Third World Network
Opening Remarks
Prof. Yogesh Pai
Assistant Professor of Law
National Law University Delhi
Associate Rapporteur, NFSI
About the Organisers
Chinmaya Viswavidyapeeth (CVV), a de-novo deemed-to-be university, aimed at building an Indian school of thought in various spheres of academic enquiries. The university aims to integrate the best practices of modern pedagogical advances with the wisdom of Indian knowledge traditions (IKT).
Inter-University Centre for IPR Studies is an autonomous centre on intellectual property, working under Cochin University of Science and Technology. The centre established by the Government of Kerala envisaged to be a research hub and resource centre for IPR by engaging in multidisciplinary research and teaching in intellectual property rights.
Third World Network (TWN) is an independent non-profit international research and advocacy organisation involved in issues relating to development, developing countries and North-South affairs. TWN’s objectives are to deepen the understanding of the development dilemmas and challenges facing developing countries and to contribute to policy changes in pursuit of just, equitable and ecologically sustainable development.
National Law University, Delhi is a law university based in Delhi established by the State Government of Delhi. The primary objective of the University is to evolve and impart comprehensive and interdisciplinary legal education that is socially relevant and professionally competent. Within a short span of a decade since its establishment, NLU Delhi has emerged as one of the premier law schools with an overall rank No. 2 in the country based on the Ministry of HRD’s National Institutional Ranking Framework (NIRF).
Please click here to view other IP related opportunities published on the blog.
Call for Papers: NUALS’ Book on ‘Pandemics: Health, Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights’ [Submit Abstracts by December 20]
We’re pleased to inform you that NUALS, Kochi is inviting papers for a book on the theme ‘Pandemics: Health, Human Rights and Intellectual Property Perspectives’. For details, please see the announcement below:
Call for Papers: Book on Pandemics: Health, Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights
About the Book
The Centre for Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR), the Centre for Health Law and Policy (CHLP), and the Centre for Human Rights (CHR) under the aegis of the National University of Advanced Legal Studies, Kochi had previously collaborated in conducting four international programmes. The first edition was based on Access to Medicine and Novel Medical Technologies while the second was focused on Traditional Knowledge. The third event was on Access to Information and Communication Technologies and the fourth on Biomedical Technologies.
Last year, the book, titled Biomedical Technologies: Health, Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights (ISBN no. 978 – 81 – 938852 – 9 – 1) was released by J. Jayasankaran Nambiar at the NUALS Campus on 25th February, 2020 and had also included selected papers from those presented at the International Conference held on the same theme.
This year we are organizing the event titled Pandemics: Health, Human Rights and Intellectual Property Perspectives and are contemplating a publication on the same. Authors are invited to contribute to the book and selected chapters/papers shall be included.
The COVID-19 pandemic has once again placed public health in the spotlight. Governments across the globe are implementing mechanisms to curb the spread of the virus. Battling a novel virus has also put immense pressure on scientists and researchers to find a vaccine as well as raised concerns on resource-allocation as well as disease management. International institutions such the United Nations, WHO, WIPO as well as other supra-national entities are stressing on interdisciplinary synergies and collaborations in these difficult times to solve these numerous issues of global concern and relevance.
Thus, with multiple institutions engaged in tackling the pandemic, the analysis of three spheres of law – Health, Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights – has become an integral part of the process.
Themes
Papers are sought on any sub-theme relating to the main topic or any of its aspects, within the broader themes of health, human rights and intellectual property rights. The following topics are illustrative:
Health
- The role of state in protection of public health
- The duties of the citizenry during situations of public health crises
- Legal preparedness of India – Tackling a public health crisis
- Occupational health and safety laws during a pandemic
- The Legality of compulsory vaccinations
- Distributional justice – Priority setting for access to vaccines and antiviral medications
- Global landscape: lessons and experiences
Human Rights
- Increased importance of health rights during public health emergencies
- Balancing of competing human rights: Role of state
- Addressing the vulnerability of migrant workers during a pandemic
- Xenophobic repurcussions of a pandemic
- Marginalization and gender-based violence during the pandemic
- Addressing the plight of refugees and asylum seekers during a pandemic
- Global landscape: lessons and experiences
Intellectual Property Rights
- Rationale for Intellectual Property Rights: Scope of exceptions and limitations
- Role of state and duties in the domain of distribution and utilization of resources: scope of intervention to private property interests
- Drug re-purposing and other mechanisms
- Licensing agreements during a pandemic
- Incentivization and open access – Distribution of knowledge and innovation during a pandemic
- Increased synergies of collaboration: future possibilities and implications
- Global landscape: lessons and experiences
Interdisciplinary themes can also be explored.
Submission Guidelines
- Submissions are to be made in electronic form only and are to be sent to ciprpublications@nuals.ac.in [Subject is to be “Submission for ISSHI Publication”].
- The paper should be in English, not exceeding 3000-5000 words (excluding footnotes).
- The paper should be accompanied by an abstract not exceeding 350 words. Please limit keywords to 4. This shall not count towards the word limit.
- Co-authorship is permitted to a maximum of two authors.
- The cover page should include name, address, e-mail ID, contact number and the name of the College/University/Firm along with the address of the author/s. In case of co-authorship, the cover page should include details of both the authors. A brief profile of the author/s not exceeding 250 words should be attached with the abstract.
- Kindly avoid the general and common information about the sub theme of your paper as far as possible as doing so may result in duplication of information in the chapters coming under a single sub-theme.
- No part of the submission should have been published earlier nor should it be under consideration for publication or a contest elsewhere.
- All contributions must represent original ideas and interpretations coupled with critical evaluation and assessment.
- Any form of plagiarism will result in immediate disqualification.
- Any queries regarding the book shall be addressed to ciprpublications@nuals.ac.in.
Formatting Guidelines
- The submission must follow the Bluebook system of citation 20th edition.
- The submission is to be made in Times New Roman, Font Size: For Title – 16; For Headings – 14; Main Text – 12, Line spacing: 1.5, Footnote size: 10.
- Alignment shall be Justified. One inch margin to be maintained on all sides.
- Submissions may be made in .doc/.docx/.odt formats only.
- Use of headings and subheadings in consistent format is encouraged.
Important Dates
Submission of abstract – 20th December, 2020
Acceptance of abstract – 30th December, 2020
Submission of full paper- 15th January, 2021
Acceptance of paper – 30th January, 2021
We welcome everyone to be a part of this discourse and contribute to the success of the publication. In case of any queries, kindly email them at ciprpublications@nuals.ac.in.
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The Fate of a Pre-Grant Opposition Filed after Refusal of Patent Application and During the Pendency of an Appeal at IPAB
We’re pleased to bring to you a guest post by Amit Tailor, analysing an interesting question about maintainability of a pre-grant opposition filed after the Controller’s rejection of a patent application; and if the decision to refuse is appealed before the IPAB, during the pendency of the appeal.
Amit is working as Manager (Sr. Scientist) at Cadila Healthcare Ltd., handling patent drafting, filing & prosecution, FTO, patentability & invalidity mainly. He has an LL.B. from the Faculty of Law, Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, Vadodara (Gujarat), and is a Registered Patent Agent and M.Pharm from National Institute of Pharmaceutical Education and Research (NIPER), Mohali. The views expressed here are personal. He’s written two guest posts, titled ‘Appeals to Controllers’ Decisions at IPAB‘ and ‘Section 46(2): ‘One Patent Per Invention’ or ‘One Invention Per Patent’?‘, on the blog previous as well. Long post ahead.
The Fate of a Pre-Grant Opposition Filed after Refusal of Patent Application and During the Pendency of an Appeal at IPAB.
Amit Tailor
Can a pre-grant opposition be filed after a patent application is refused by the Controller; and if the decision to refuse is appealed before the IPAB, during the pendency of the appeal? Can a pre-grant opposition be filed before the IPAB (during the pendency of an appeal)? What would be the status of an application during appeal, whether it stands disposed of/inactive or pending? What would be the status upon appeal? Many questions of this nature arose after the IPAB refused to hear a pre-grant opponent who approached the Board, after the Board ‘concluded’ hearing in an appeal matter, wherein the order was reserved for giving reason but wasn’t actually pronounced (IPAB order dated 21 August 2020 in OA/2/2016/PT/MUM, para 61 onwards).
The applicant filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court pleading to get himself heard in the matter (by the IPAB or the Controller ???; most probably, by the IPAB?). However, the Bombay High Court dismissed the petition, with cost, finding it non-maintainable (Writ Petition (L) No. 3718 of 2020, judgement dated 5 November 2020).
For the purposes of this post, two points are to be noted: i) at IPAB, the Board determined that the ‘pre-grant applicant’ did not approach the Board as per prescribed procedure (and probably therefore refused him a hearing in the matter); and ii) the High Court narrowly concluded that the pre-grant opposition was not maintainable in law and therefore the writ could not be entertained, and the Court further hinted* that their discussion in this case may not be a precedence for pre-grant opposition matters in future, [*see especially the expression “First aspect is the stage at which the pre-grant opposition under Section 25 of the Act can be filed. …. Our discussion on the legal position is in respect of the facts in this case.” at para 16 of the judgement (above), (emphasis supplied)]. Therefore, this post seeks to throw some light on the legality or the validity of the act of filing a pre-grant opposition after an application is refused by the Controller and/or during the pendency of an appeal, should the refusal be appealed (independent of this specific case).
The Scheme of Pre-Grant Opposition under the Patent Act
Section 25(1) of the Patent Act read with Rule 55 provides for filing a pre-grant opposition as – where an application for a patent has been published but a patent has not been granted, any person may represent by way of opposition (in Form 7(A)) to the Controller against the grant of patent only on one or more grounds listed in clauses (a) to (k) therein. (emphasis supplied)
On a plain reading, Section 25(1) provides that any person, without the need to show any bonafide or standing or even without disclosing their true identity, can represent by way of pre-grant opposition before the Controller, from the day the application is published till a patent is granted thereto. This indicates that there is no strict timeline for the ‘public’ to file a pre-grant opposition; the same can be filed ‘anytime’ as long as the application is not ‘granted’. However, at the same time there is a provision to safeguard the public interest against the ‘express allowance’ of any application. Under Rule 55(1A), no patent shall be granted before 6 months from the date of publication of the application, providing the public with a reasonable amount of time of at least 6 months to oppose any ‘objectionable’ grant.
When is a Patent ‘Granted’?
To be able to effectively file a ‘pre-grant’ opposition, it would be necessary to ascertain the ‘pre’-grant phase, and for that, to figure out what is actually a ‘grant’, and to know when a patent is actually deemed granted under the Act. Neither the Act nor the Rules clearly defines what actually constitutes a grant, or when a patent is actually deemed to have been granted. As per Section 43, a patent shall be ‘granted’ (i) as expeditiously as possible (ii) when the application is found to be in order for grant by the controller; (iii) the patent shall be “granted” with the seal of the office and (iv) the same shall be entered in the patent register (v) along with the date on which the patent was granted; and (vi) upon grant the Controller shall publish the fact that the patent has been granted and (vii) shall lay the relevant documents on record open for public inspection.
Ample ambiguity is present in the plain reading of Section 43, regarding when a patent shall be deemed to be found in order for grant by the Controller: is it the moment– when the Controller decides allow the patent? or, when he pronounces his decision orally? Or, when he records the fact in writing in the office file/register, or in his order under section 15? Or when he publishes the fact that the patent is granted? Or when exactly? Or The Bombay High Court judgement (above), at para 22, throws some light on the issue; especially Snehlata C. Gupte v. Union of India, as cited therein. In Snehlata C. Gupte, the Delhi High Court held that “the date on which the patent is granted cannot be the date of issuance of certificate but has to be the date on which orders are passed by the Controller… It is the date on which the decision is taken by the Controller on file … which is the determining event ascertaining the date of grant of patent. The sealing of the Patent and entering of the same in the register are ministerial acts which follow the Controller’s act of grant of patent”. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of Snehlata C. Gupte, it would be safe to comment that a patent shall be deemed to be granted when the fact, that the Controller has decided to grant the patent, is entered on file, i.e. on record. Thus, a “pre-“grant opposition can be filed since the application is published till the time the Controller records, on file, that a patent is (“shall be”) granted on the application. However, the implications of refusal are materially different than that of grant, on the status of the application and on filing of a pre-grant opposition.
The Effect of Refusal and Appeal on the ‘Status’ of Application
The question that is harder to answer is as to what happens when a pre-grant opposition is filed after the application is refused by the Controller and when the decision is appealed before the IPAB.
Under Section 21(1), if the applicant fails to address any of the objections raised by the Controller to their satisfaction within the prescribed time, the application shall be deemed as abandoned; whereas, if the Controller is not satisfied from the submissions on record, s/he may refuse the application under Section 15; and once the application is deemed abandoned or refused, it should stand ‘inactive’ or ‘disposed of’. However, Section 21(2) provides that should an appeal be pending before the High Court at the time of expiration of the time period under Section 21(1), the same shall be extended till such date as the High Court may determine and, under Section 21(3), if the time within which an appeal under Section 21(2) has not expired, the Controller may extend the period prescribed under Section 21(1) to such further period as he determine. However, Section 117G mandates that all appeals to the Controller’s decision (including all revocation petitions other than on counterclaim in infringement suits) pending before any High Court, shall be transferred to IPAB upon notification to that effect, i.e. upon the IPAB becoming functioning; and fresh appeals thereafter shall be filed before IPAB under Section 117A. Therefore, the expression “High Court” in Section 21(2) may not be restricted to High Courts only and should include IPAB as well, as the appellate authority, when read in conjugation with Sections 117A and 117G.
Upon combined reading of the Sections 21, 117A and 117G, it can be inferred that if a patent application is refused by the Controller under Section 15 (or deemed abandoned), it does not become ‘inactive’ immediately, but remains ‘active’ or ‘pending’ till the time during which an appeal to it may be preferred. If an appeal is preferred, the time period to comply with obligations stand extended, till further time, which would be naturally beyond the period of pendency of the appeal before the High Court or the IPAB. Therefore, it is safe to comment, that during the pendency of an appeal, the application can be considered ‘pending’ or ‘under examination’ and not ‘refused’ or ‘inactive’. An application becomes inactive only on the expiration of the period specified in Section 117A, and not before that. (Further the Controller can be approached to review his own decision under Section 77(1)(f) too before the appeal).
The Effect of ‘Stay’ and ‘Reversal’ (of the Controller’s Order) on the ‘Status’ of the Application
In light of the above discussion it can be inferred that irrespective of whether the Controller’s decision is stayed or not, on appeal, the application shall stand pending and not refused, during the pendency of the appeal. Now comes the question of what happens when there is a ‘reversal’ of refusal- i.e. if the board orders the ‘grant’ of the patent.
The provisions of Section 43 and Section 117D(2) can throw some light on this aspect of the ‘Grant’. Section 117D(2) mandates that a certified copy of the order or the judgement of the Appellate Board shall be communicated to the Controller by the board and the [Controller] shall give effect to the order of the Board and shall amend the entries in, or rectify, the register in accordance with such order. And as per Section 43, a patent shall be granted as expeditiously as possible when the application is found to be in order for grant by the Controller, and the Delhi High Court, in Snehlata C. Gupte (above), held that “the date on which the patent is Granted is the date on which the decision is taken by the Controller on file“.
On combined reading of the above, it can be inferred that even upon reversal of the Controller’s order by the IPAB, the patent shall not be deemed granted immediately. The Board may order the Controller to act in accordance with their order or the judgement, but it is the Controller, who ‘shall give effect’ to the order and amend or rectify the register accordingly. The order of the Board to ‘grant’ the patent is, therefore, a mandamus for the Controller to act in accordance and is not an ‘order of grant’. The patent would not be deemed granted until the Controller gives ‘effect’ to the order. The Board can direct the Controller to act in accordance with the order only on the facts that are brought on record during the appeal; whereas, if any new fact or argument presented before the Controller (e.g.in a ‘pre-grant’ opposition) that is not materially discussed before the Board, the Controller is bound by the law to take into consideration such further facts and arguments, under section 25(1), as long as they are presented before he ‘grants’ the patent.
Therefore, though ‘refused’ and under appeal, an application is still deemed pending or under examination, and ‘not granted’, till the order or the judgement of the Board to reverse the refusal and grant the patent is given effect by the Controller.
Having arrived at the inferences that i) a patent application shall not become ‘inactive’ immediately after a refusal; ii) it cannot be deemed either ‘refused’ or ‘granted’ on appeal during the pendency of the appeal; and iii) it shall not be deemed granted till the time the reversal is recorded on file by the Controller. we can now answer the questions raised at the beginning of the post as follows –
Anyone can file a pre-grant opposition –
A) until the application is ‘granted’ by the Controller, and
B) even if the application is refused, –
- during the period within which an appeal to the Controller’s decision can be preferred,
- if the decision is appealed, during the pendency of the appeal, and
- even if the Board reverses the refusal, till the time the Controller gives effect to the reversal by entering those details on record.
LexisNexis Webinar on ‘Understand the Innovation Landscape of Global Video Conference Technology’ [December 23]
We’re pleased to inform you that LexisNexis is organizing a webinar on ‘Understand the Innovation Landscape of Global Video Conference Technology’ on December 23, 2020. For further details, please read the announcement below:
LexisNexis Webinar: Understand the Innovation Landscape of Global Video Conference Technology [December 23]
About LexisNexis IP
We, LexisNexis Intellectual Property, are a leading global provider of the entire patent workflow solutions designed specifically for professionals in the intellectual property market, government agencies, and the life sciences industry. LexisNexis has worked in the patent arena with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for nearly half a century and offers a suite of IP solutions that deliver the results you need across the patent workflow under the LexisNexis IP name. LexisNexis IP solutions are a comprehensive approach to patent analytics and search.
We conduct various webinars and share recordings every month on the latest topics in the IP industry. You may follow the updates on these events on our LinkedIn page here.
About the Webinar
We’re delighted to invite you to join a live webinar being organized by LexisNexis ‘Understand the Innovation Landscape of Global Video Conference Technology’ on 23rd December, 2020. In this webinar our experts will highlight the current and future trends in video conference technology, the new players entered the market and who will be dominating the industry in different video technology fields.
When?
The webinar will be held on December 23, 2020 (Wednesday) from 3.30 to 4.15 pm IST.
By Whom?
The webinar will be led by Dr. Sarbani Chattopadhyay (Ph.D., LL.M). She is a computational biologist with a Ph.D. in Biochemistry from the University of Calcutta in Calcutta, India, and an LL.M. in European IP and IT Law from the University of Göttingen in Göttingen, Germany. As a consultant at PatentSight GmbH, a LexisNexis company, in Bonn, Germany, she works with clients all across the globe in different technology fields in searching and analyzing patents, patent landscape and technologies from patent perspective, where she utilizes her knowledge and expertise in combination with the PatentSight Business Intelligence Analytics Software to gain insights about patent portfolios and technologies
Registration
Please click here to register for the webinar.
Contact Details
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact us at ip@lexisnexis.com.
Please click here to view other IP related opportunities published on the blog.
India on TRIPS Waiver: Will WTO Pass the Test of Humanity?
India, through its Ambassador and Permanent Representative at the WTO, delivered a short but strong statement at the WTO TRIPS General Council Meeting held between 16-18th December, 2020, on the on-going TRIPS waiver proposal. (context here for those unaware of the waiver proposal – in brief, South Africa and India proposed a waiver for the WTO TRIPS provisions that relate to, i.e., restrict, vaccines, treatment options, etc for Covid-19, for the duration of the pandemic). Pointing out that making the vaccines accessible and affordable is going to be a test of our humanity, India also noted that history will remember the WTO’s response to this pandemic, and that the WTO needed to prove they can deliver in a time of crisis. India’s statement also pointed out that currently ongoing voluntary activities such as COVAX and ACT-accelerator were inadequate to meet global needs, and that none of the pharma companies who have developed vaccines have joined WHO’s C-TAP. India also indirectly noted the hypocrisy of developed countries when saying “ Global community should not be looking inward at this juncture. Though we have repeatedly heard that no one is safe until everyone is safe, yet even the most optimistic scenarios today cannot assure access to vaccines and therapeutics for all, even by the end of 2021.”
India’s statement comes some days after South Africa (the other initial co-sponsor of the waiver proposal) delivered a much longer, and stronger statement at the TRIPS Council meeting. South Africa specifically called out the voluntary measures (that US, EU, Japan suggested as the best solution) as ‘ad hoc, non-transparent and unaccountable’ deals that reinforce ‘vaccine apartheid’. It also detailed in depth how the waiver proposal is a calibrated and proportionate response suggestion (i.e. how it wouldn’t apply to non-Covid drugs, counterfeits, etc, while also noting that quality of drug and IP protection over a drug have no connection). South Africa’s statement is definitely worth reading in full and KEI has made it available here.
Regardless of this – EU’s statement, on 18th December, reflects that it still believes that intra-TRIPS solutions are the best way forward. On on-going arrangements such as COVAX it had to say: “COVAX is indeed an excellent tool for wealthier countries to provide vaccines for deployment in countries with fewer financial means.” (note: this is as opposed to measures which include these ‘poorer’ countries doing their own manufacturing! Colonial legacy of holding on to means of production?). EU also stated that compulsory licensing is a valid way forward as well (it would be wonderful if this memory stays sharp years down the line, in non-Covid contexts, when member countries may decide to implement CLs for reasons they choose as valid, rather than when EU says ‘now its okay’). EU’s statement is available here.
On a related and very informative note – on the Medicines Law and Policy blog, Christopher Garrison has put together a wonderful read on the various issues involved in scaling up producing of Covid-19 related treatments etc, when considering the whole “intellectual property stack” (including among other things the often severely inadequate ‘disclosures’ that patents are supposed to have but don’t.) I’m reproducing one key image below – but the whole article is worth reading in full.
For those interested, India’s full statement, taken from here, has been reproduced below:
“Statement by India – Delivered by Ambassador & PR to the WTO
Agenda 13– TRIPS COUNCIL MATTERS
STATUS REPORT ON THE CONSIDERATION BY THE TRIPS COUNCIL OF THE “PROPOSAL FOR A WAIVER FROM CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT FOR THE PREVENTION, CONTAINMENT AND TREATMENT OF COVID-19” (IP/C/W/669) – STATEMENT BY THE CHAIR OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRIPS
Thank you Chair.
We thank the TRIPS Council Chair for the status report. We would also like to thank the Members for a constructive debate in TRIPS Council on the Waiver Proposal. More than half of WTO Membership has expressed support. We also acknowledge the tremendous support from various Organisations and multilateral agencies. Rarely has an issue being dealt within WTO, united so many divergentgroups of society across developed, developing and Least Developed Countries in delivering a clear message.
While discovering vaccines was a test of science, making them accessible and affordable is going to be a test of our humanity. Now that we can see the silver lining in terms of emerging successful vaccines; it is in every Member’s interest, economic or otherwise, that this pandemic is brought under control as early as possible by providing an equitable, affordable and timely access to vaccines for all. Even for economic argument, 1%of improvement in world GDP from baseline scenario will add more than US$ 800 billion in global output.
During the initial stages of pandemic, we have seen nations pursue their health security goals. All of us witnessed the shortages of essential COVID-19 items, like PPE kits, gloves, sanitizers etc. at the start of the pandemic. But the world was able to upscale the manufacturing of these items by pooling resources and production capacities. At present, we need the same pooling of IP rights and know-how for scaling up the manufacturing of vaccines and treatments, which unfortunately has not been forthcoming, necessitating the need for waiver.
Chair, we would like to emphasize that this is not a proposal only for India but for the global community at large. India may be having the required manufacturing capacity and the national legislations to cater to its needs. But we believe that in a global pandemic, where every country is affected, we need a global solution. Global community should not be looking inward at this juncture. Though we have repeatedly heard that no one is safe until everyone is safe, yet even the most optimistic scenarios today cannot assure access to vaccines and therapeutics for all, even by the end of 2021.
WTO has responsibility to ensure that any of its agreement including TRIPS do not become a barrier to accessing vaccines, treatments, or technologies in the global response to COVID-19. Our Waiver Proposal is a targeted and proportionate response to COVID-19, as it seeks waiver for a limited period from four specific sections of the TRIPS Agreement. It will ensure that the intellectual property rights do not restrict rapid scaling up of manufacturing of COVID-19 products. All Members have agreed that real challenge now is to ramp up manufacturing capacity.
Chair, we welcome the global cooperation initiatives including COVAX and ACT-accelerator. However, these initiatives are inadequate to meet the massive global needs of the 7.8 billion people of this world. None of the pharma companies developing the vaccines have joined WHO’s C-TAP initiative which encourages voluntary contribution of IP, technology and data to support global sharing and scale-up of manufacturing and supply of COVID- 19 medical products.
Compulsory licenses are issued on a country by country, case by case and product by product basis, where every jurisdiction with IPs would have to issue separate compulsory license, practically making collaboration among countries extremely onerous. While the proponents encourage the use of TRIPS flexibilities, the same are time-consuming and cumbersome to implement. Hence, their use in context of COVID-19 pandemic does not present a viable option.
Chair, over the course of four (formal and informal) meetings of TRIPS Council, proponents have provided substantive answers including evidence based answers to the questions raised by some Members, with the spirit of constructive engagement. We will be interested in knowing that further evidences are sought.
Chair, it is important to keep in mind that how the WTO Membership chooses to respond to this pandemic today will be remembered for years to come. We need to take time-bound action now and prove to the world that WTO can indeed deliver in times of crisis. History is being written today. It is up to the Members to choose which side of history they would like to be. We hope that all WTO Members will rise to the collective call of action and can achieve consensus for the Waiver that is so crucial for saving people’s lives.
Thank you, Chair”
Readers interested in more details on the proposal can view our earlier posts here and here.
Please click here to view our other posts related to COVID-19 and here to view other important IP developments related to it.
SpicyIP Weekly Review (December 14 – 20)
Topical Highlight
India on TRIPS Waiver: Will WTO pass the test of humanity?
Swaraj gave us an overview of India’s statement on the on-going TRIPS Waiver proposal, delivered at the WTO TRIPS General Council Meeting held from 16th-18th December, 2020. He explains that India strongly appealed to WTO’s responsibility to respond during this time of crisis and also pointed out that COVAX and ACT-accelerator were inadequate to meet global needs. India’s statement also indirectly calls out the hypocrisy in developed countries’ response which does not live up to their promising statements of collective responsibility and action. Swaraj also outlines South Africa’s longer and stronger statement which called out the voluntary measures (that US, EU, Japan advocated) as ‘ad hoc, non-transparent and unaccountable’ deals that reinforce ‘vaccine apartheid’ and detailed in depth how the waiver proposal is a calibrated and proportionate response suggestion. He further revisits EU’s statement, which continues to support intra-TRIPS solutions such as compulsory licensing, and lauds the COVAX initiative, as opposed to measures that mobilise local manufacturing. He concludes by sharing an important analysis by the Medicines Law and Policy blog of the various issues involved in scaling up production of COVID-19 related treatments etc, when considering the whole intellectual property stack.
Thematic Highlight
The Fate of a Pre-Grant Opposition Filed after Refusal of Patent Application and During the Pendency of an Appeal at IPAB
In a guest post, Amit Tailor evaluated the question of maintainability of a pre-grant opposition filed after the Controller’s rejection of a patent application; and if the decision to refuse is appealed before the IPAB, during the pendency of the appeal. He explains that Section 25(1) of the Patent Act which provides that any person can represent by way of pre-grant opposition before the Controller, from the day the application is published till a patent is granted thereto, narrowing down the question to exactly when a patent is granted. He then revisits Sections 43 and 15, as well as Bombay HC’s decision in Snehlata Gupte case, to suggest that a patent shall be deemed to be granted when the fact, that the Controller has decided to grant the patent, is entered on record. Thus, a ‘pre-grant’ opposition can be filed between when the application is published to the time the Controller records the grant. He relies on Sections 21, 117A and 117G, to infer that if a patent application is refused by the Controller under Section 15 (or deemed abandoned), it does not become ‘inactive’ immediately, but remains ‘active’ or ‘pending’ till the time during which an appeal to it may be preferred. Thus, even upon reversal of the Controller’s rejection order by the IPAB, if any new fact or argument presented before the Controller (e.g.in a ‘pre-grant’ opposition) that is not materially discussed, the Controller is bound by the law to take it into consideration under section 25(1), as long as they are presented before he ‘grants’ the patent.
Other Posts
Supreme Court Interprets ‘High Court’ under Section 22(4) of the Designs Act
Varsha discussed the Supreme Court’s interpretation of certain important terms under the Designs Act in S.D. Containers Indore v. Mold Tek Packaging. This dispute consists of a series of suits and counter suits relating to cancellation of registered designs which ended in the MP High Court finding that the Commercial Court, Indore is the competent court for adjudication as per the Commercial Courts Act. This order was challenged before the Supreme Court. Notably, this cancellation petition would be governed by the Designs Act as well as the Commercial Courts Act. Navigating through the overlapping rules of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court found that the Commercial Courts Act neither prohibits nor permits the transfer of proceedings under the Designs Act to High Courts which do not have ordinary original civil jurisdiction. If there is a counter-claim for cancellation of registration, then even if the High Court does not have such jurisdiction, the transfer of the suit to the High Court is mandatory. Varsha notes that the judgment is well-reasoned and consistent with jurisprudence, overruling MP High Court’s order that would have otherwise created conflicting precedents. She concludes by revisiting the position in Trade Marks Act and recommends a similar standard for design infringement suits to ensure clarity.
NUJS Online Lecture by Prof. David Nimmer on Google v. Oracle Case [December 23]
We announced that NUJS IP & Technology Laws Society (IPTLS) at NUJS, Kolkata is organising an online lecture by Prof. David Nimmer on the Google v. Oracle case, in the memory of our Founder Prof. (Dr.) Shamnad Basheer. The lecture is scheduled to be held on 23rd December at 10:30 AM IST. Registration and other details are available in the post. For a background of the case, our previous posts covering the dispute may be referred – ‘And we thought Java API’s were open?’ and ‘Oracle v Google – US Court of Appeals Rules Against Google’s ‘Fair Use’ of Oracle’s Java APIs’. These posts discuss the decisions handed down by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2014 and 2018 respectively.
Update: Wuhan Court Rejects Application to Reconsider Anti-Suit Injunction Granted in Favour of Xiaomi
Mathews noted a new development in the SEP dispute between InterDigital and Xiaomi that InterDigital. Previously, we had covered this dispute in our posts – ‘China Enters the Realm of Anti-Suit Injunctions in Standard Essential Patent (SEP) Cases’, ‘Delhi High Court Issues Anti Anti-Suit Injunction in InterDigital v. Xiaomi Patent Infringement Dispute’ and ‘The Issue of Sovereignty and Grant of Patents in Anti-Anti-Suit Injunction Issued by Delhi High Court’. It may be gathered from here that InterDigital has filed an application before the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court to reconsider the anti-suit injunction granted in favour of Xiaomi. This application was rejected by the Wuhan Court.
NFSI Panel Discussion on ‘TRIPS Waiver Proposal – State of Play and the Way Forward’ [December 18]
We informed our readers that an online panel discussion on ‘TRIPS Waiver Proposal – State of Play and the Way forward’ was being organised on 18th December at 7:30 PM IST. Details on the same can be found on the post. Praharsh has discussed the waiver proposal in an earlier two part post on the blog which can be viewed here and here.
Call for Papers: NUALS’ Book on ‘Pandemics: Health, Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights’ [Submit Abstracts by December 20]
We carried a call for papers from NUALS, Kochi inviting submissions for a book on the theme ‘Pandemics: Health, Human Rights and Intellectual Property Perspectives’, for which, abstracts must be submitted by December 20th. Details regarding submissions are available on the post.
LexisNexis Webinar on ‘Understand the Innovation Landscape of Global Video Conference Technology’ [December 23]
We announced that LexisNexis is organizing a webinar on ‘Understand the Innovation Landscape of Global Video Conference Technology’ on December 23, 2020. Registration and other details are available on the post.
Other Developments
Decisions from Indian Courts
- Bombay High Court in Unilever Plc & Anr v. Rahul Goyal ordered a temporary injunction restraining the Defendant from trading, marketing, distributing, selling, offering for sale cosmetic preparations and other like goods used in the cosmetic industry bearing the impugned counterfeit marks or any mark/s identical with and/or deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s trade marks ‘LAKME’, ‘LAKME NINE TO FIVE (9 to 5)’, ‘LAKME EYECONIC’, L- Logo and the U-Logo, so as to infringe upon the Plaintiffs trade mark ‘LAKME’ [November 2, 2020].
- IPAB in Haryana Soap Factory v. A. J. Saravanan decided to hear both parties on merit and refused to stay the registration of Trade Marks No. 936165 and 1833170 [November 3, 2020].
- IPAB in M/s Koral Industries LLC v. Registrar of Trademarks allowed the applicant’s appeal and set aside the Respondent’s order of 5th December 2018, allowing the use of the trademark ‘KORAL LOS ANGELES’ subject to the conditions provided [November 6, 2020].
- IPAB in Pharmatop SCR v. Venus Remedies India & Anr, set aside the order of the Controller of Patents & Designs and held that Appellant deserved to be given a fair opportunity to be heard on the sole aspect of ‘inventive step’, thus remanding the matter back to the Controller, to decide the matter on merit, strictly within 3 months [December 4, 2020].
- A Delhi District Court in L’Oreal v. Sangam Packers, wherein the Defendant had been accused of manufacturing, marketing, selling, trading and using the trademark/labels, that were identical and deceptively similar to the trademark and logo of the Plaintiff, decreed a suit in accordance with a joint compromise between the parties [December 10, 2020].
- Allahabad High Court in Amit Kumar v. State of UP refused to quash an FIR dated registered under Sections 420, 467, 471, of the IPC & Sections 102, 103 of the Trade Marks Act for making fake detergent in the name of a detergent brand with registered trade mark, stating that under Section 115 of the Trade Marks Act these are cognizable offences [December 14, 2020].
- Delhi High Court in Allied Blenders And Distillers v. Ads Spirits Private Limited & Anr decreed a suit in accordance with the settlement between the parties, wherein the Plaintiff agreed that it has no objection to the use of the label/trade dress/mono carton of the Defendant No.1 subject to the company writing the trademark ‘DOUBLE BLUE’ in pantone shade number 7499. The Defendant No.1 undertook that it will cease the use of the Plaintiff’s label/trade-dress [December 15, 2020].
- Delhi High Court in Merck Sharp And Dohme Corp & Anr v. Century Pharmaceuticals Limited, where the Plaintiff accused the Defendant of manufacturing and selling its patented compound, SITAGLIPTIN PHOSPHATE MONOHYDRATE, restrained the Defendant as per the Plaintiff’s prayers [December 15, 2020].
- Delhi High Court in Interdigital Holdings Inc. v. Xiaomi Corporation, rejected the idea of the constitution of a ‘two-tier’ Confidentiality Club proposed by InterDigital, instead suggesting the terms for constitution of a single-tier Confidentiality Club [December 15, 2020].
- Bombay High Court in Hindustan Unilever Ltd v. Balaji Enterprises ordered an interim injunction restraining the Defendant and all those connected with the Defendant in their business from manufacturing, marketing, distributing, packaging, selling and/or using in any manner whatsoever in relation to their flour, flour preparations and any other like goods the impugned mark ‘ANAPURNA GOLD’ and/or any mark containing the word ‘ANAPURNA’, or any mark identical with and/or deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s trade mark ‘ANNAPURNA’, so as to pass off their goods and business as and for those of the Plaintiff or in some way connected or associated therewith [December 15, 2020].
- Telangana High Court in Novartis Ag v. Msn Laboratories Pvt .Ltd observed, without expressing any opinion on merits or demerits of the case, that the issues raised by the parties can be decided by the learned Single Judge and the parties may approach the learned Single Judge to take recourse to undo any damage or disadvantage, if any, suffered on account of non-extension of interim orders [December 15, 2020].
- Bombay High Court in Indian Association of Physiotherapists v. Indian Association of Physiotherapy & Ors, passed an interim injunction wherein the Respondents and all persons acting on their behalf or connected or associated with them were restrained from using in any manner in relation to their services, the impugned marks ‘The Indian Association of Physiotherapists-IAP’ & ‘PHYSIOTHERAPY INDIA’ as a mark or service mark, trade name, trading style or domain name or email ID or passing off their products or services as those of the Plaintiffs [December 15, 2020].
- Delhi High Court in Astral Poly Technik Ltd v. M.K. Ploymers & Ors decreed a suit in terms of the settlement between parties wherein the Defendant undertook to restrain themselves from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, advertising, directly or indirectly dealing in pipes and fittings including but not limited to, for use in plumbing, industrial, sewerage, fire, agricultural, surface drainage; pipes and fittings made of PVC, CPVC, UPVC or any other material; any flexible and/ or rigid pipes; parts and fittings thereof under the impugned mark ‘ASTRO’ or or any other trade mark as may be deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s trade mark ‘ASTRAL’ [December 17, 2020].
- Rajasthan High Court in Shree Cement Limited v. Union Of India listed for hearing a case concerning objections raised by the Bureau of Indian Standards to the Plaintiff’s use of a trade mark which it found to be misleading [December 18, 2020].
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Bombay High Court in International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Vishna Foods Pvt. Ltd. passed an order of temporary injunction restraining the Defendant, a food and hospitality service provider, as well as its associates and representatives, from using the mark ‘ISKCON’ or any other mark identical with and/or deceptively similar to the said well-known marks of the Plaintiff in relation to goods/services offered by the Plaintiff [December 18, 2020].
- A Delhi District Court in Yash Tekwani v. Dheeraj Kashyap confirmed a previous order of interim injunction against the Defendants, restraining them from selling, offering for sale and goods, advertising or promoting any product under the trademark or tradename, ‘PRINCE/PRINCE CHAAT BHANDAR’ with the logo or any trademark which may be deceptively/confusingly similar with Plaintiff’s well-known trademark ‘PRINCE/PRINCE CHAAT CORNER’ [December 19, 2020].
Other News from around the Country
- UP has sought GI tags for three of its Varanasi based products, Ramnagar brinjal, Adamchini rice and Banarasi Langda mango.
- India is reportedly set to produce about 300 million doses of Russia’s COVID-19 vaccine Sputnik V in 2021.
- Natco Pharma is reportedly considering filing for a compulsory license to manufacture generic versions of Eli Lilly’s COVID-19 drug ‘Baricitinib’ [Please click here to view COVID-19 related updates on SpicyIP].
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Britannia Industries has sued rival ITC Ltd for alleged infringement of its product packaging trademark by using similar design for ITC’s new biscuits.
- The Calcutta High Court has restrained the Indian Institute of Hotel Management from using the ‘IIHM’ acronym in the latter’s legal battle with International Institute of Hotel Management.
- The writer of popular Indian sitcom ‘Sarabhai v. Sarabhai’ has accused a Pakistani serial of copying the show ‘word to word’ and ‘frame to frame.’
- India’s national television broadcaster Doordarshan (DD) has been made copyright claims against YouTube channels showcasing space technology that use ISRO’s rocket launch visuals.
- Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) has released the Toys (Quality Control) Second Amendment Order, 2020, but exempted handicraft and GI toys from the same.
- Medianama has published its Roundtable on Copyright and Digital Media which discusses possible amendments to the Copyright Act in light of DPIIT’s notice seeking comments on the same.
- IPO announced that due to technical reasons, Virtual Show Cause Hearing of Trade Mark Applications scheduled for 21st December 2020 to 23rd December 2020 shall stand Adjourned.
- A piece by Anjali Vats in The Conversation discusses the racist, sexist, and xenophobic norms behind inventorship and patenting.
News from around the World
- Nepal seeks to claim GI rights on Basmati rice in the European Union (EU), challenging India’s application for rights over the same.
- Duesseldorf Regional Court in Germany has suspended proceedings in Nokia’s licensing dispute with Daimler and referred the same to the CJEU.
- French luxury designer label Givenchy has been accused of ‘appropriation and creative colonisation’ for allegedly copying the design of a New York-based designer’s leather hats.
- A Swedish Appeals court partly granted an appeal by telecoms regulator PTS over its plan to exclude Chinese telecom equipment maker Huawei from the country’s 5G networks.
- CJEU has ruled in favour of Morbier, a creamy French cheese with a seam of dark ash through its middle, which enjoys a ‘Protected Designation of Origin’ (PDO) tag in the EU, finding a copycat producer’s goods to be likely to mislead consumers.
- Cipla has announced the settlement of its litigation with Celgene Corporation, a subsidiary of Bristol Myers Squibb in a dispute relating to the patent on revlimid (lenalidomide) which is used to treat multiple myeloma and myelodysplastic syndromes. Consent judgments will be filed in the US District court for the District of New Jersey.
- WIPO has enhanced its WIPO Pearl to give access to scientific and technical terms derived from patent documents in order to help promote accurate and consistent use of terms across different languages.
SEPs and Confidentiality Clubs: Protecting Fair Play from Excessive Secrecy
InterDigital, in its ongoing SEP infringement dispute with Xiaomi, proposed a Confidentiality Club for sharing confidential documents to assess whether the licensing terms being offered by InterDigital were on FRAND basis. While both parties were in agreement with the thought of having a confidentiality club, it is the structure of this club that was opposed by the defendants. Particularly, InterDigital’s proposal sought to restrict access to certain confidential information from the defendant’s representatives, and to be subject only to external eyes. The Delhi High Court in a recent order ruled in favour of the defendants and rejected this proposal. In this piece, I will discuss the court’s treatment of InterDigital’s proposal and the implications that it has on interests of licensees in SEP disputes.
The Two-Tier Proposal
InterDigital proposed for a “two-tier” Confidentiality Club to be set up consisting of an outer-tier for accessing “Confidential Information” and an inner-tier for “Legal Eyes Only (LEO) Confidential Information”. As the court explains,
“The difference between these two tiers, as visualised and suggested by InterDigital, is that the “outer tier” documents and material would be accessible to the advocates for both sides, experts appointed by them, as well as representatives of both parties, whereas the “inner tier” documents would be accessible only to the advocates for both sides (who would not be in-house counsel), and experts appointed by them.”
The inner-tier, thus, sought to exclude any representatives of parties, “other than “non-in-house” advocates and the experts appointed by them”, from accessing its documents. These documents would have included, inter alia, “confidential, comparable patent license agreements on FRAND terms, as executed by the parties in the suit”. In support of this proposal, InterDigital argued that disclosure of the impugned information would be prejudicial to its commercial interests. Particularly, as its licensing contracts with third parties contained confidentiality clauses, it could not divulge the information. Moreover, it stated that anyways given the highly technical nature of the information, Xiaomi was bound to take decisions almost in sync with the opinion of technical and professional experts and disclosure of information to the parties was not required. Additionally, it stated that this structure was reciprocal in that it would also allow Xiaomi to restrict information from the representatives of InterDigital. It also added that the two-tier regime only had to be set up for adjudicating upon the interim injunction. Finally, it highlighted that such a model has been accepted by courts all over the world in SEP infringement litigations including in India.
Judgment
The court rejected all the contentions raised by InterDigital as far as exclusion of representatives of parties is concerned. On the issue of confidentiality agreements with third parties, the court held that they cannot “justify denial of fair opportunity” to the defendants. It discarded the argument on reliance merely on experts by pointing out that no educated litigant would keep themselves disassociated from the facts and leave it up solely to experts. The argument on reciprocity of confidentiality was considered irrelevant as it was obvious if the court granted confidentiality to one party it would accord the same to the other. Similarly, it rejected the point on restricting the regime to interim injunctions as an injunction against the defendant would lead to “permanent and irreversible” damage. Finally, the court looked at the past precedents relied upon by the plaintiff in favour of excluding party representatives from the confidentiality club. It highlighted that in most of the cases such exclusion was not opposed by the other parties and merely passed sub silentio. In the two cases where such a proposal was contested, either the contentions raised in the instant case were not raised, or the court did not return any finding on them. Similarly, for authorities from foreign jurisdictions, the court noted that there was no serious contestation on this point and in any case the instant application had to be decided based on the peculiar nature of the Indian jurisprudence. Apart from these denials of the plaintiff’s arguments, the court made two specific arguments in reaching its conclusion: that based on ‘fair play’ and that based on ‘lawyer-client’ relationship.
Fair Play
The court noted that a civil litigation generally requires each party to be aware of the case of the other party that it is supposed to counter, and no surprises should, thus, be permitted in this regard. In the context of the instant dispute, the determination of whether licensing rates set by the SEP owner are FRAND require assessment of license agreements with other licensees, considering the identity of the licensee and the scope of the license. This assessment cannot be carried out solely by advocates and external experts to the exclusion of party representatives. This is because given the large commercial implications of this assessment and the necessity of knowledge of market and structure of the company, externals cannot adequately determine even the question of comparability of the other licensees to the defendant. In such a scenario, the court held that it would be an affront to the principles of fair play and natural justice if the parties are excluded from this discussion. Moreover, the court emphasised the fact that it is InterDigital that has dragged Xiaomi to court and was relying on third-party agreements for FRAND terms. In such a scenario, it is highly unfair to exclude these documents from Xiaomi’s perusal and it “would result in an unequal balance”.
Lawyer-Client Relationship
The court reproduced the authoritative findings from the case of Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh to reflect upon the lawyer-client relationship in India. The reproduced paragraphs examined several precedents and the BCI rules to emphasise that the lawyer is required to act on the instructions of the client and to not “substitute their judgment for that of the client”. With this principle in mind, the court held that a confidentiality club consisting solely of lawyers without them being able to discuss the documents with the clients would be contrary to the lawyer-client relationship. This is because it would then necessarily require the lawyer to substitute their wisdom and what they deem fit as against the wishes of the client. Moreover, this would have acted as a hurdle in the lawyer being clearly instructed by the client with the court coming in between the relationship of an advocate and a client. This aspect is what specifically allowed the court to differentiate the instant case from the authorities referred to by the plaintiffs.
Comment
In a previous post, Rajiv has aptly highlighted how the constitution of confidentiality clubs might be antithetical to the very concept of SEPs. This is because the entire standards as well as their configuration is already public and a cover of confidentiality does not let parties to become aware of the specifics of the different license agreements entered into by the SEP owner and the circumstances surrounding the same. This allows SEP owners to extract high sums, particularly prejudicing smaller licensees. This problem is further exacerbated if even the limited access that is provided through a confidentiality club is not even available to parties in dispute and only provided to experts. The implications of such exclusion have been examined in extensive detail on the blog earlier by Yashwant.
In this context, the Delhi High Court decision is a well-reasoned judgment that adequately secures the interests of the licensees. Without the inclusion of the parties within the confidentiality clubs, from the licensee’s perspective it would have basically been a shot in the dark, merely hoping that the external experts somehow are thorough with the intricacies of the particularities of the working of the licensee, as well as the market. There would, thus, have not been any possibility for the party to truly determine that the licensing terms are FRAND compliant. This decision emphasises that the SEP owners cannot have their cake and eat it too, by relying on their third party agreements without providing access to the same to the licensees. At the same time, the court does not discount the interests of the SEP owners in hiding certain confidential information for their commercial interest. For this purpose, it allows for them to redact such information and to exclude parties from confidentiality clubs provided all parties agree to the same. In this manner, the court strikes an adequate balance between the interests of the various stakeholders such that all litigants are at an equal footing in putting forth their claims. More important, from a public interest point of view, is the emphasis on transparency by the court. The SEP owners cannot whimsically be permitted to treat certain material as confidential or redact any information from the eyes of licensees or the court. The court secures this aim by providing two safeguards: first, the SEP owner cannot rely on any such redacted document to put forth their injunction claim; and second, the licensee has an equal right to contest such redaction in light of the necessity of such information for fixing FRAND rates.
It is hoped that this decision serves as a guiding light for the development of jurisprudence around the use of confidentiality clubs in SEP infringement cases. Admittedly, however, its application beyond SEP disputes might be slightly limited given that the harms through disclosure of confidential information in areas such as trade secrets might be substantially high to push for exclusion of interested parties who might unduly gain from such confidential information. Nonetheless, despite this scenario, the courts must push for transparency to be the norm and confidentiality an exception, and instead of blindly taking a party’s word for hiding documents from public view they must allow litigants to contest any such attempts of confidentiality that seek to deviate from the principle of open courts. To part, it is interesting to note that despite the extensive reliance by the plaintiff on foreign jurisdictions including the UK to show the commonality of confidentiality clubs, the decision in TQ Delta LLC v. Zyxel Communications UK Ltd was not brought to the court’s attention which allows for exclusion of parties in SEP disputes only in exceptional circumstances.
The Section 3(e) Soup: What makes for Synergistic Effect?
Earlier this month, Pune-based home maker Shubhangi Patil was granted a patent over her unique Ragi-walnut Soup Mix Composition. The mix claims to combine Ragi (finger millet) and walnut to create a nutrient-rich substitute for non-vegetarian foods containing calcium, Omega-3 and Omega-6 fatty acids which can be used to treat Vitamin B12 deficiency. According to the patentee’s statements to The Hindu’s Business Line, she invented the soup out of necessity owing to her husband’s health condition which needed him to consume protein-rich foods such as eggs and meat whereas he preferred only vegetarian diet.
Food patents and the Section 3(e) Challenge
Since the 2005 Amendment to the Patent Act, 1970, the Indian Patent Office has granted patents on food-related inventions. A previous post by Kiran Mary George explains how the threefold requirement of novelty, non obviousness and utility, apply to food-related inventions. Some Indian food patents have been granted on: wheat chocolate bar for sustained energy release (IN 229291), fermentation process for production of tender coconut wine (IN 209015), and fried banana masala chips making process (IN 198069).
When it comes to food-related inventions, Section 3(e) is particularly relevant as it screens claims to ensure that frivolous patents aren’t granted. This section assists the Patent Office in determining whether the food-related claim is an invention in the first place. Section 3(e) disqualifies claims that fail to meet its standard in addition to the threefold test of patentability. It prohibits the grant of patent on substances ‘obtained by a mere admixture resulting only in the aggregation of the properties of the components thereof or a process for producing such substance’ (emphasis added). To avoid attracting Section 3(e), a claim must show that the interaction between the components involved in the invention achieves a combined effect which is different from the sum total of the effects of the individual substances. The invention should be able to show an unforeseen synergistic effect, rather than a mere additive effect. That is, (A) + (B) = (A+B)’
This presents a challenge before food patents because usually, food items are simply the expected sum total of their individual components. A new method of cooking rice might not have been previously employed, but if it provides the nutritional value that is expected to be provided through such a method or by use of the chosen ingredients, i.e., it shows nothing more than an additive effect.
The Ragi-walnut soup applicant, in reply to the 3(e) objection, states that the soup shows ‘enhanced health benefits and nutritional values’. While it does provide the nutritional value of each of the ingredients and that of the soup mix, it is doubtful whether this sufficiently proves synergistic effect. To meet the threshold, experiment results must show the individual values of ingredients as well as their expected sum total value. This sum total would then serve as a reference point to compare with the actual value obtained, in order to prove that the latter is different from what the ‘mere admixture’ would provide. Thus, both the expected (A) + (B) = (A+B), and the invented (A) + (B) = (A+B)’ must be shown and the difference between (A+B) and (A+B)’ be explained through data analysis. Without this, the synergistic effect analysis is incomplete. And yet, this has passed the scrutiny of the Patent Office.
Pharma Patents and Section 3(e) Misses
Nonetheless, all said and done, food is rather innocuous and it would be interesting to see how this patent is enforced in other people’s kitchens. However, let’s turn to a sector that has more noticeable, far-reaching consequences. Section 3(e), along with Sections 3(d) and 3(i), forms a set of anti-evergreening provisions present in the Act that create exceptions from patentability in order to prevent the extension of patent monopoly over variants of existing inventions. Thus, a detailed scrutiny into whether Section 3(e) disqualifies the patent is absolutely necessary for the safeguards in the Patent Act to fully operate. While the soup mix patent does not have significant implications on public health, the Patent Office has faltered in its assessment of synergistic effect in case of other types of patents as well, including pharma patents.
AccessIBSA’s study of 2293 patents granted between 2009 and 2016 shows that nearly 72% of these patents were granted for marginal improvements over previously patented drugs. The study estimates that from this pool, as many as 297 patents are likely in violation of Section 3(e). The complete report can be accessed here.
Let’s look at some other recent examples (and a shoutout to Sandeep Rathod and others who regularly mention such examples on their social media pages). In the proceedings of a recent post-grant opposition filed against Troikaa Pharmaceuticals for IN 231479, one of the grounds for opposition was Section 3(e). The Controller found that there was no data provided to establish or substantiate unexpected synergistic effect between the components used in the formulation when taken individually or in combination. The revocation order emphasized that the data showing that effect must be clearly incorporated in the description by way of comparison. Similarly, a pre-grant opposition against Lincoln Pharmaceuticals’s application for ‘A Pharmaceutical Formulation for Paracetamol Injection’ (Appl. No. 1746/MUM/2008) succeeded in obtaining a rejection on multiple grounds including Section 3(e). The Asst. Controller specifically stated: ‘since Glycofurol and alcohol are individually known to solubilize paracetamol, it was imperative to provide comparative data to show the synergistic effect (enhanced solubility) achieved through the combination of solvents.’
Although IN 231479 was ultimately revoked and 1746/MUM/2008 rejected, their lack of synergistic effect data went unnoticed in the Patent Office’s Examinations. The fact that such a serious issue wholly escaped the scrutiny of the Patent Office and only came to light through Opponents’ intervention is worrying.
Section 2 justifies Section 3?
Section 2 of the Patents Act lays down the conditions of patentability, whereas Section 3 creates exceptions from patentability. The Supreme Court in Novartis v. Union of India, while discussing therapeutic efficacy under Section 3(d), held that in order to gain a chemical or pharmaceutical patent, a product must pass this test in addition to the requirements of Sections 2(1)(j) and 2(1)(ja) (see para 190-192).
However, pharma companies have been seen to rely on novelty and/or non-obviousness of a claim to bypass the requirements of Section 3(e). In reply to the Patent Office’s Section 3(e) objection in Application No. 4045/DELNP/2014, the applicant stated that since the novelty of the composition was acknowledged, it cannot be deemed a mere admixture of known components. The Controller then proceeded to grant the patent. Similarly, in Application No. 4538/CHENP/2013 filed by Genentech, the Patent Office, after raising aSection 3(e) objection, then went on to accept that the provisionwould not be attracted because novelty and inventive step are acknowledged. These are not isolated cases. The AccessIBSA report linked above lists 19 pharma patents between 2009-2016 where such an objection has been overcome by citing Section 2(1)(j).
Considering Novartis makes it clear that the Sections 2(1)(j) and 2(1)(ja) and Section 3(d) have to be satisfied separately, the Patent Office’s practice of allowing applicants to circumvent Section 3(e), a similar anti-evergreening provision, by showing novelty and/or inventive step, cannot make for sound legal precedent.
Importance of Synergy Data
The synergistic effect in an invention cannot simply be stated, but needs to be shown through detailed, comparative analysis of data relating to individual and combined results. This would entail not only the statement of the result or technical effect achieved by the claim, but the description and measurement of the improvement from what would have been the expected result. While several errors persist, the Patent Office has also rightly rejected a number of applications which have not shown how synergistic effect is achieved (see for e.g. applications 2641/MUM/2015 and 4670/DELNP/2011). Such an in-depth scrutiny approach needs to be followed for all patent applications.
Unlike the more controversial Section 3(d), so far Section 3(e) has not received equal international attention. However, its importance in preventing evergreening attempts cannot be undermined. AccessIBSA’s report shows that only 12 patents were granted where the order clearly cited the data that proves synergism (see page 27). In many others, either no synergism data was reproduced in the order (it might still have been submitted to the Patent Office) or the order does not provide any clear reasoning as to how the objections were overcome. This, coupled with the estimated 72% error rate in secondary patent grants, makes it evident that the Patent Office needs to be more vigilant and observe stricter scrutiny.
(Note: All comments on the specific patent applications/grants above are after a personal first level analysis and readers are welcome to give in their comments if they have a contrary take or more information on the same).
Time to More Seriously Question the Spectre of Copyright in the Realm of Education
Several students and researchers may have noted that social media was recently abuzz with the news that SciHub and LibGen were being taken to court for copyright infringement, by Elsevier Ltd (UK), Wiley India, Wiley Periodicals (USA), and American Chemical Society (USA). The giant publishers seem to be asking the court to grant a dynamic injunction against these ‘rogue websites’, so as to block them en masse. The case is up for hearing tomorrow (24th Dec) morning. As Arul’s pointed out in his op-ed here, this has garnered quite a bit of panic amongst the many who often have no choice but to rely on SciHub and LibGen for their research purposes, with many wondering if they should intervene in the suit. We’ll be bringing you a more in-depth post on this case soon, and in the meanwhile, readers interested may want to brush up on the DU Photocopy case once again, or read Divij’s 2017 post on Sci-Hub and disruption of the Academic Publishing Industry I’m sure other writers will also highlight the huge revenues of these global publishers even as they shift to a more online than print business model (especially versus the complete non-profit, no charge, no ads scihub and libgen websites – which should raise strong fair use arguments), the awkward timing of this suit when world over people – especially scientists – are asking for more access to scientific material in the light of covid, the greater need for digital libraries in the ‘work/study from home’ months going on, etc, etc.
all Sci-Hub addresses are under threat of being blocked in India after Elsevier, Wiley and American Chemical Society lawsuit. The hearing in High Court of Delhi is scheduled on 24 December. https://t.co/UFo8P63usc pic.twitter.com/kfPDMGtxUc
— Sci Hub (@Sci_Hub) December 21, 2020
For the purposes of this post (or perhaps more accurately, rant), I want to simply point out that this case, regardless of which way it goes, does serve the purpose of highlighting the question – why do so many in India (and the world) need to rely on Sci-Hub and LibGen for access to works in the first place? Of course, the simple answer is – it is so ridiculously expensive, what other choice is there, if one wants to study or research!? We could of course limit our education, and I’m sure countries that appreciate cheap labour won’t have a problem with this. (Yes – education correlates to development, this isn’t rhetorical). In fact, as per this study that came out 2 months ago – richer countries tend to be more intense users of ‘shadow libraries’ like SciHub and LibGen. The study also interestingly points out that lower income countries do not even get the same benefit from access to these shadow libraries as richer countries, because of other infrastructural constraints. So – to start with – regardless of whether this is legal or illegal – even the phenomenal access that these shadow libraries provide – still aren’t enough to ensure that our researchers are able to get maximum benefit from these scholarly works. One can imagine how much worse off our researchers would be if they did not even get this access to scholarly works! On the other side of all this, is the well known ‘hilarity’ in the question of how much most academic authors make off of their books. Academics need to publish for tenure, to receive grants, to receive recognition for their works. But, this often has little correlation to whether they make money from their works – though publishing houses certainly do. Indeed – most serious academics would much rather prefer their works be read widely and engaged with, not hidden behind a paywall. This isn’t to say journals have no value-addition. They most certainly do. But it is certainly hard to believe that they provide more value than the actual author themselves!
Structurally, why and how are we (especially in these ‘poorer’ countries) allowing this to happen? Perhaps, as Akshat wrote in the context of music recently, it is time to ask for an amendment disallowing corporate assignment of copyright over scholarly works – so that authors have more bargaining power when getting into these publishing contracts. Perhaps it is time for the government / large universities to invest in non-profit publishing houses that will focus on more accessibly priced / open access works. Perhaps it is time to mandate that all journals deposit copies of their articles into national library repositories for wider access, the way it is done with books in several countries already. (If this is mandated – would publishers be willing to accept similarly strict penalties for not complying?) Perhaps its time for peer-reviewers who do so much free labour for publishing houses, to start having a larger say in how accessible a work should be to the larger society! Many scholars have put forth various solutions already and surely there are plenty more out there that can be thought up of.
Health and education are two major pillars of any nation’s socio-economic development. Our patent policy has put in several safeguards for public health. Perhaps it is time for us to take our copyright safeguards for education more seriously as well. Regardless of how and when this case gets decided, it is clearly important that our academics, policy makers and civil society start to focus on this question of how we are allowing this spectre of copyright – that was supposed to help advance society – to play any role, much less such a defining role, in denying so much to the population who are trying to learn and educate themselves.
IPAB’s Order Staying ‘N95’ Trademark Registration Highlights Systemic Failures
Introduction
In an order earlier this month, the IPAB issued an interim stay of the operation of the trademark registration for the word ‘N95’ (registration number 4487559 in class 10). The IPAB prima facie held that ‘N95’ is a generic word and could not have been registered under section 9 of the Trade Marks Act. I have no comment on the outcome of the order, and frankly, it is doubtful whether the registration would survive a final hearing. There have been several reports throughout the COVID-19 period on ‘N95’ face masks/respirators flooding the Indian market even though they do not really satisfy the ‘N95’ standard (e.g. this report). The order, when read in the context of the above facts, brings me to two points:
A. How Did It Get Registered?
The first is the obvious one – how it got granted in the first place. A quick search on the Trade Marks Registry’s website reveals that this application was filed by the proprietor on a ‘proposed to be used’ basis on 14th April, 2020, accepted on 11th June, 2020, advertised in the journal on 22nd June, 2020 and the certificate was ultimately granted on 11th November, 2020. No adverse examination report was issued. A further quick search on the Registry’s website for the word mark ‘N95’ in class 10 shows at least four other attempts to register the same with/without an accompanying device/logo, all of which have been objected to. Yet, this one registration sails through with absolute efficiency, and with absolutely no objections at all. The Trade Marks Registry never ceases to amaze me.
B. Trademarks and Regulatory Overlap: Certification Marks
The second is the abject failure of the regulatory system and this is a topic that involves trademark law overlays as well. The word ‘N95’ is actually a certification in the United States under 42 CFR part 48, titled ‘approval of respiratory protective devices’, intended only for items that fulfil a certain regulatory standard. The alphabet ‘N’ stands for ‘not oil resistant’ and ’95’ indicates that it filters out at least 95% of airborne particles. My quick search of the USPTO database, however, shows that much like the case in India, an attempt was made by a private proprietor to register ‘N95’ in the US in September 2020, which has been objected to by the USPTO (US Serial No. 90169399; non-final rejection issued on 3rd December, 2020; full documentation can be obtained from https://tsdr.uspto.gov/). What is surprising, however, is that the US Department of Health and Human Services Agency filed an application for ‘N95’ as a “certification mark” only on 17th June, 2020 (US Serial No. 90006709)!
A ‘certification mark’, for the uninitiated, is a mark that may be granted to a compliance agency (not to a person who would use it in the course of trade) to ‘certify’ that the goods conform to certain characteristics, such as origin, mode of manufacture, quality etc. Examples are ‘WIFI’ and ‘Woolmark’. In India, this is governed under Chapter IX of the Trade Marks Act.
Anyway, it seems that on 10th July, 2020, the USPTO has ‘suspended’ processing of this application by the US Government department for ‘N95; because there are six (6) other applications carrying the ‘N95’ word with an earlier filing date, and all of them filed by private individuals! The USPTO apparently was concerned that if one or all of these other pending applications were allowed, there would be likelihood of confusion! It may sound surprising that an application for a ‘certification mark’ by a government authority would be put on ‘pause’ because private players have filed individual applications comprising the word ‘N95’ (e.g., ‘N95 certified’). Unfortunately, it appears that this is a procedural inconvenience because, in law, due process must be followed qua the other applications by private proprietors.
With this base application in the US, the US Department of Health and Human Services Agency also moved an international application under the Madrid Protocol, which now bears the international registration no. 1564247 with effect from 19th August, 2020 (details available here). The list of designations made by the US department includes India (this information can be obtained from https://tsdr.uspto.gov/).
This Madrid application by the US department translates into India as TM Application No. IRDI-4783107. The status page of the Indian Trade Marks Registry’s website says this application is ‘Objected’ but I do not see any uploaded documents. Once it enters India, the statute (and the Madrid Protocol) allows the Indian Trade Marks Registry to raise objections to the international application within a specified timeline as if it were an Indian application. Rule 72 of the Trade Mark Rules, 2017 requires that the regulations governing the ‘certification mark’ (i.e. 42 CFR part 48) must be directly forwarded to the Indian Trade Marks Registry. Nothing in the statute precludes a foreign certifying agency to obtain registration of such ‘certification marks’; in fact, it may be illegal to do so.
The observation/finding of the IPAB is the above-noted case that the word ‘N95’ is ‘generic’ would not come in the way of this ‘certification mark’ for N95 being registered in India because by virtue of section 69(a) of the Trade Marks Act, sections 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(c) do not apply to certification trade marks. In contrast, section 11 does apply and thus, in theory, the ‘certification mark’ could be objected to/rejected/opposed for likelihood of causing confusion. But this is a far-fetched hypothetical because if ‘N95’ is generic and being used by everyone in the market, a private player’s registration/use coming in the way of the ‘N95’ certification is not likely.
If this registration for ‘certification mark’ in favour of the US department is allowed in India, it would then mean that no person can use ‘N95’ on the specified products such as masks/respirators, without compliance and certification from the US Department. That may be good news at least in one way – assuming the US department is truly interested in ‘policing’ this certification in India, consumers may feel safer. But it is equally disappointing that one must be dependent on the ‘policing’ by a US department to ensure safety standards of masks/respirators in India.
The lack of implementation of the corresponding Indian standard or ‘certification mark’ is also one of the reasons for this. In my understanding, the BIS has issued a separate standard with the denomination “IS:9473” and perhaps, at a technical level, the standards may be equivalent – I have not analysed this aspect. However, there is hardly any popularisation of this BIS standard. For instance, take the notification dated 13th March, 2020 bringing, inter alia, masks under the Essential Commodities Act, 1995. Happily, the Government states ‘masks (2ply & 3ply surgical masks, N95 masks)’ are all essential commodities. You do not find mention of any ISI standard in this but there is a clear reference to ‘N95’. I am sure that a small sample survey of consumers would confirm the following statement – most consumers may recognize ‘N95’ to mean something, but I doubt consumers are even aware of the corresponding Indian BIS standard.
Although the Bureau of Indian Standards Act, 2016 empowers the Government to notify products that cannot be sold without compulsorily conforming with the applicable BIS standards, I did not locate ‘masks’ or ‘respirators’ or anything similar under this list (see here). This means that technically, masks can be sold in India without complying with the Indian standard. Further, masks/respirators would be ‘medical devices’ governed and regulated under the Medical Devices Rules, 2017 (as amended in 2020), though the compliance period is (at present) in 2021. The CDSCO could, in theory, impose the IS standard as being mandatory.
A corresponding problem is that nothing in Indian law, till date, prohibits anyone from using ‘N95’. The law (thanks to the initiative of a private player) may have to come to the rescue in this one instance, preventing someone from misappropriating ‘N95’ as a proprietary trademark. But preventing everyone from using ‘N95’ willy-nilly requires a separate notification (or legislation), duly issued/passed under Indian law. Under the Bureau of Indian Standards Act, what is prohibited is the use of the ‘IS: 9473’ symbol/word (or anything else giving the impression that it is certified by the BIS) on the product without a license/certificate of conformity.
Simply put, neither does anyone have to mandatorily conform to the Indian standard nor does the Indian regulatory law preclude any person from using the ‘N95’ word on the packaging/on the product (irrespective of whether they fulfil this standard). Given the fact that all sorts of notifications and orders are being passed during this disaster period and having recommended and enforced the wearing of masks/respirators, the failure to assess this issue is inexcusable. The only measure, it seems (thanks to Swaraj for pointing this out to me) was an advisory from the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) for manufacturers to get BIS certification. Perhaps, and this is entirely my own speculation, this omission was intentional – the fear being that one may actually not have enough supply of actual ‘N95’ compliant masks/respirators, which would have only increased public alarm.
Once the US obtains its ‘certification mark’ registration for ‘N95’ in India, it will not be possible for the BIS to obtain a second certification mark on the same. It is time that quality standards for masks/respirators are made mandatory in India and an appropriate ‘Indian’ ‘certification mark’ be adopted by the Government.
Supreme Court Revisits the Tribunal Culture (yet again); Upholds the Validity of the 2020 Rules, but with Conditions.
Adding to an existing trail of decisions on administration of the tribunals, the Supreme Court on 27/11/2020 passed a detailed judgement in Madras High Court Bar Association v. Union of India, wherein it upheld the constitutional validity of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2020 (or Tribunal Rules 2020). Among other things, the decision is crucial for its observation on appointment of the Chairpersons, Vice-Chairperson and Technical Members to different judicial tribunals. The present post shall reflect on the key aspects of the judgement and shall discuss its implication on the appointment of the IPAB Chairperson subsequent to the tenure of the incumbent Chairperson Retd. Justice Manmohan Singh, who is set to re-retire on 31/12/2020.
Background and the Decision
On 13/11/2019, the Supreme Court deemed the Tribunal Rules 2017 unconstitutional, in Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Limited. Consequently, the government passed the Tribunal Rules, 2020 on 12/02/2020. These rules deal with qualifications, appointment of members to the judicial tribunals by recruitment, procedure for inquiry into misbehavior and other conditions of services. The petitioner, Madras High Court Bar Association, in the Writ Petition (Civil) no. 804 of 2020 (taken as the lead case by the court) challenged the constitutional validity of the Tribunal Rules, 2020 for being ultra vires under Article 14, 21 and 50. One of the main arguments of the petitioner was that the Tribunal Rules 2020 were the replication of the previous Tribunal Rules 2017. The court agreed with the petitioner but still upheld the validity of the 2020 rules after being assured by the Attorney General that appropriate amendments will be carried in the 2020 rules. The court relied on its previous decisions like L Chandra Kumar, Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2014), Union of India v. R. Gandhi, Sampath Kumar v. Union of India among others and held that:-
- A National Tribunals Commission must be established to supervise the appointment and functioning of judicial tribunals. This commission must also fulfill the necessary infrastructural, financial and other needs of the tribunals.
- Re-constitute the 4 members Search-cum-Selection Committee, under the Tribunal Rules 2020, to a 5 members committee for appointment of members to the tribunals. The court directed that the Secretary to the Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India be added to the committee as a member, and that the Secretary of the parent ministry remain as a member, but without a vote.
- Amend Rule 4 (2) of the Tribunal Rules, 2020 to provide for the Search-cum-Selection Committee to recommend only one name for the appointment to each post instead of a panel of two or three names.
- The Central Government shall make appointments to the Tribunals within three months from the date on which the Search-cum-Selection Committee makes the recommendation.
- Directed to increase the term of the office of the Chairperson to five years or till they attain the age of seventy, whichever is earlier. And the term of office of the vice chairperson to five years or till they attain the age of sixty seven, whichever is earlier.
- Directed the Tribunal Rules, 2020 to have prospective effect and be applicable from 12/02/2020. Therefore, any appointment to the post after the above date shall be in accordance with the Tribunal Rules, 2020.
- The court suggested via an obiter that “it’s crucial that tribunals are run by a robust mix of experts, i.e. those with experience in policy in the relevant field, and those with judicial or legal experience.”
For a detailed summary of the decision see the livelaw coverage of the judgement here and here.
Implications of the decision on the IPAB
The writ petition filed by International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (AIPPI) (W.P. (civil) No. 1431/2019) were among the other petitions which were clubbed in the present case. Readers may recall that it was by virtue of this petition, the term of the serving Chairperson of the IPAB was extended beyond his age of superannuation not once but twice (See here and here). With the petition now disposed of and a fresh pair of directions issued regarding appointment to the tribunals, one may wonder what shall be the implication of this decision on appointments to the IPAB?
A shot at separation of powers, yet again
The judgement addressed the flaws in the appointment procedure from the perspective of the principle of separation of powers. The Court noted that impingement by the executive in appointments for tribunals isn’t a recent finding. Specifically speaking about the IPAB, way back in 2011, Retd. Justice Sridevan submitted a report to the Madras High Court, in Shamnad Basheer v. Union of India, to appraise the court on the state of the then Search-cum-Selection Committee for appointment of the IPAB Chairperson. In the report she highlighted that the Committee was headed by the Secretary of Dept. of Industrial Policy and Promotion, instead of the serving Chairperson or any other judicial officer. The Madras High Court took note of this (see specifically paras 9.5 and 9.6) and ruled that “such a composition should exhibit the leading role of the judiciary.” With specific directions 1 and 2 above, the court seeks to resolve this discrepancy. The proposed National Tribunal Commission can take care of the administrative and financial needs of the tribunals, and the re-constitution of Search-cum-Selection Committee can strike the right amount of balance between the number of members from judiciary and executive (2+2+1(without the power to vote)). Theoretically speaking, this seems like a decent way out. However, one apparent flaw in this arrangement is that the court has not demarcated between the powers and functioning of the National Tribunal Commission and the Search-cum-Selection Committee. The court seemed to have suggested that the proposed Commission will take care of the appointments to the tribunals, however, in such a situation, one must ask what is the use of the Search-cum-Selection Committee then? Perhaps a little clarification to this regard would have made this arrangement seem more concrete.
Delayed appointments to the IPAB
The court also took a note of the delayed appointments by the executive to the tribunals. Speaking about the IPAB, Prashant and Pranav have previously highlighted that in its 17 years of existence, the board has not had a Chairperson for a cumulative total of 1,130 days! Balu and Pankhuri too pointed to the undue delay in appointment of the Chairperson here. The directions 3, 4 and 5 above seem to address this. Prior to this decision, a Chairperson (who is a former high court judge) could only serve for 2-3 years post his/ her retirement from the high court at 62 years. With the age of retirement increased to 70 or five years, whichever is earlier, now the Chairperson can serve a few more years. Similarly, the court by fixing a period of three months within which the government must make the appointment, and directing the Search-cum-Selection Committee to make just one suggestion instead of three, has made an attempt to expedite the appointment process. However, one apparent shortcoming of the above direction is that the court has not commented on the time within which the Search-cum-Selection Committee must finalize its nomination. One may argue that this time frame by the committee shall form a part of the discretionary power under Rule 4(2) of the 2020 rules, however, any directive/ suggestion from the court on this would have been appreciated.
Appoint experts first, then leave it to them
However, the most significant takeaway from this decision in context of IPAB is the above-mentioned obiter calling for a mix of experts and judicial members in a tribunal. IPAB, owing to its nature, requires assistance from technical members, who are theoretically appointed specifically by the virtue of their past experiences with the relevant subject matter. However, due to frequent and long vacancies in appointment of the technical members and consistently piling of disputes, necessity has forced a technical member to adjudicate on the disputes outside the purview of his expertise. We have previously highlighted how patent matters were heard by the PVPAT technical member (see here and here). In light of the same, this obiter acts as a sweet reminder that merely incorporating an arrangement will not suffice but the same must be backed by timely appointments of the technical members to the tribunals.
With the date of re-retirement of the incumbent IPAB Chairperson approaching and the process for appointment of the new Chairperson already underway (see here), this decision tends to bring some clarification on the ensuing appointment. However will the government act or not, in time this time, is a question worth placing your bets on.
SpicyIP Weekly Review (December 21 – 27)
Topical Highlight
Time to More Seriously Question the Spectre of Copyright in the Realm of Education
Swaraj reported that SciHub and LibGen were taken to court by Elsevier UK, Wiley India, Wiley Periodicals USA, and American Chemical Society for copyright infringement, seeking a dynamic injunction. He highlights several issues that are likely to gain attention regarding this dispute – the contrast between the heavy profit-making, increasingly online model of the publishers and Sci-Hub and LibGen’s complete non-profit, no charge, no ads websites; the poor timing of the suit in light of increased demand for access to scientific scholarship during COVID-19; and the pressing need for digital libraries in the ‘work/study from home’ setting. He then explains how despite the phenomenal access that these ‘shadow’ libraries provide, their benefits still remain more accessible to people from rich countries only. Whereas, authors of these academic works barely earn any money out of this as the same goes largely to the publishing houses. He touches upon solutions such as statutorily disallowing corporate assignment of copyright over scholarly works, investment in non-profit publishing houses focusing on accessibility, maintaining national library repositories, among others. He concludes that regardless of the verdict of this case, our academics, policy makers and civil society need to look into how copyright can be prevented from becoming a barrier to education by blocking access to scholarship.
Thematic Highlight
SEPs and Confidentiality Clubs: Protecting Fair Play from Excessive Secrecy
Nikhil discussed the Delhi High Court’s decision on constitution of a Confidentiality Club for sharing confidential documents in InterDigital v. Xiaomi. InterDigital had proposed that the club constituted to assess whether the licensing terms being offered by InterDigital were on FRAND basis have two tiers: an “outer tier” where material would be accessible to the advocates for both sides, experts appointed by them, as well as representatives of both parties, and an “inner tier” which would receive documents accessible to all of the above except the parties’ representatives. InterDigital argued that this model would preserve confidential commercial information and it has been accepted by courts all over the world in SEP infringement litigations. Further, as matters are highly technical anyway, the parties’ decisions would be in sync with those of the experts. The court rejected this on two grounds – fair play, which requires each party to be aware of the case of the other party that it is supposed to counter; and the nature of lawyer-client relationship which mandates that the lawyer act on the instructions of the client and not “substitute their judgment for that of the client.” Nikhil comments that this decision is well-reasoned and strikes a balance between the interests of the various stakeholders, while also keeping in mind transparency from a public interest perspective.
Other Posts
The Section 3(e) Soup: What Makes for Synergistic Effect?
I discussed the patent granted to a Pune-based home maker over her unique ragi walnut soup mix composition, highlighting problems with the Indian Patent Office’s assessment of synergistic effect under Section 3(e) of Patents Act. I explain that in order to avoid attracting Section 3(e), a claim must show comparative data to prove that the interaction between the components involved in the invention achieves a combined effect which is different from the sum total of the effects of the individual substances, which the soup patent does not. I then point out that the Patent Office has been liberal and inconsistent in its synergistic effect assessments by citing examples where such problems have altogether been missed during Examination and only brought out due to pre-grant or post-grant oppositions. Further, in some cases, applicants have successfully relied on novelty or inventive step as a proof of synergistic effect whereas synergistic effect is an independent, anti-evergreening provision. I conclude by underlining the importance of detailed scrutiny of synergy data by the Patent Office to prevent evergreening.
IPAB’s Order Staying ‘N95’ Trademark Registration Highlights Systemic Failures
Adarsh analysed the issues surrounding ‘N95’ trademark registration with reference to an IPAB order pronouncing ‘N95’ to be a generic word disqualified under Section 9 of the Trade Marks Act. He expresses surprise at how the Trademark Office appears to have rejected at least four other attempts to register ‘N95’ under Class 10, while this one application was accepted with no objections at all. He informs that in the US, the US government’s Department of Health and Human Services Agency filed an application for ‘N95’ as a ‘certification mark’, but the USPTO has ‘suspended’ processing of this application because there are six other private individuals’ applications carrying the ‘N95’ word with an earlier filing date, and granting of any of these would create likelihood of confusion. The government department has also moved an international application under the Madrid Protocol, including in India. Adarsh comments that the granting of this application in India may make consumers feel safer, but it is disappointing that one must be dependent on the ‘policing’ by a US department to ensure safety standards of masks/respirators in India. He criticises the fact that neither the BIS nor any law (saving an advisory from the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority for manufacturers to get BIS certification) in India regulates the use of ‘N95’ mark by setting any safety standards, concluding that such standards should be made mandatory in India.
Supreme Court Revisits Tribunal Culture (Yet Again): Upholds Validity of 2020 Rules with Conditions
Praharsh discussed the Supreme Court’s judgment in upholding the constitutional validity of the Tribunal Rules 2020 and its implication on the appointment of the IPAB Chairperson subsequent to the tenure of the incumbent Chairperson Retd. Justice Manmohan Singh. The Supreme Court, after considering a number of factors and previous judgments has provided a number of directions for tribunals in general which are applicable to IPAB as well. As per these directions, the proposed National Tribunal Commission can take care of the administrative and financial needs of the tribunals, and the re-constitution of Search-cum-Selection Committee can strike the right amount of balance between the number of members from judiciary and executive. Further by fixing a period of three months within which the government must make the appointment, and directing the Search-cum-Selection Committee to make just one suggestion instead of three, the order has made an attempt to expedite the appointment process. Lastly, the most significant take away from this decision in context of IPAB is the call for a mix of experts and judicial members in a tribunal.
Other Developments
Decisions from Indian Courts
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IPAB in Red Bull AG v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Limited & Ors., dismissed the Plaintiff’s request for cancellation of the Defendant’s trademark ‘YOUR WINGS TO LIFE’ on the ground that plaintiff could not prove itself to be a ‘person aggrieved’ under Section 47 of the Indian Trademarks Act [August 25, 2020].
- A Delhi District Court in Under Armour Inc. v. Avengers granted a mandatory injunction in favour of the Plaintiff restraining the Defendants from using the trademarks and copyright in ‘UNDER ARMOUR’, ‘UA’, ‘UA RECORD’, and its logos and other registered trademarks of the plaintiff on goods including apparels and accessories in any form and manner [December 14, 2020].
- Bombay High Court in Savla Corporation v. Aristo Apparels passed an interim injunction against the Defendant restraining them from using the Plaintiff’s trademark ‘SERO’ or any derivatives containing the ‘SERO’ mark on men’s apparel [December 16, 2020].
- Bombay High Court in Midas Hygiene Industries Private Ltd v. Ram Dev Industries, granted a temporary injunction to the Plaintiffs restraining the Defendants and from passing-off their goods by adopting and/or using in any manner the impugned label with or without the words LAKSHMAN CHAKAR or any label or mark identical with or similar to the Plaintiffs’ trademark label and trademark LAXMANREKHAA as trademark or otherwise in relation to preparations for repelling and destroying flies, insects, mosquitoes, disinfectant preparations for destroying vermin, fungicides, herbicides or similar goods [December 17, 2020].
- Delhi High Court in Novartis Ag & Anr v. Eris Lifesciences Limited directed the Defendant to file an affidavit detailing the stock of the impugned product that is available with it, setting forth the source from which the stock was received, the quantity of the stock received, and the sales made by the defendant after the receipt of the stock [December 21, 2020].
- Delhi High Court in Merck Sharp And Dohme Corp & Anr v. Achemic Pharmaceuticals Limited, decreed in accordance with the settlement between the parties, wherein Defendant No. 1 undertook that it will not deal with SITAGLIPTIN in any manner, including launching a generic version of SITAGLIPTIN until the expiry of IN 209816 or abandonment, or invalidation [December 21, 2020].
- Delhi High Court in TIPS Industries v. Glance Digital Experience Pvt. Ltd refused to grant an ad-interim injunction against the Defendants injunction which had been sought by the Plaintiff alleging infringement of the Plaintiff’s exclusive rights and copyrights in their repertoire [December 21, 2020].
- Delhi High Court in Tommy Hilfiger Europe v. M/s Taqua Textiles & Ors, passed a decree in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants in a suit regarding the infringement of the Plaintiff’s trademark ‘TOMMY HILFIGER’ [December 22, 2020].
- Delhi High Court in Freemans Measures Pvt Ltd vs Mankaran Bhandari & Ors granted a permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from infringing the Plaintiff’s trademarks ‘Hi-WIDE’, ‘Hi-16’, ‘Hi-19’, ‘Hi-25’, ‘Mi-19’ and ‘CONFLEX’ [December 22, 2020].
- Delhi High Court in Indian Singers Rights Association v. Dharma Productions Pvt. Ltd. noted that the term ‘performer’ includes a singer within its sweep and the performers’ right means any visual or acoustic presentation made live by one or more performers, listing the suit for hearing [December 22, 2020].
- A Delhi District Court in Lalit Babbar & Anr v. Remson Prime Technologies Pvt. Ltd. while determining jurisdiction, afforded the Plaintiff an opportunity to state the ‘specified value’ of the suit which concerned the legality of an aspect of Deed of Assignment assigning the trademark ‘REMSON PRIME’ [December 23, 2020].
- Delhi High Court in H Lundbeck A/S & Anr v. Hetero Drug Ltd. & Anr granted an ad-interim injunction in favour of the Plaintiffs who had accused the Defendants of manufacturing and exporting substantial quantities of generic version of VORTIOXETINE to Latin America and Canada [December 23, 2020].
- Delhi High Court in Jagmohan Ratra v. Ampa Cycles Pvt. Ltd. & Anr acknowledged the Plaintiff to be a prior user of the ‘AMPA’ trademark and passed an interim injunction restrained the Defendant No. 1 from using the mark and the logo or any other mark which is deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s mark AMPA with logo amounting to passing off its goods as that of the plaintiff, and Defendant No.2 from using the domain name www.ampacycles.com [December 23, 2020].
- Delhi High Court in Infiniti Retail Ltd v. M/s The Croma ordered an interim injunction against the Defendants restraining them from infringing the plaintiff’s trademarks CROMA and passing off its goods as that of the Plaintiff [December 24, 2020].
Other News from around the Country
- IPAB is to hear submissions by various parties in IPRS’s claim for compulsory licensing under Section 31D on 28th December.
- The Delhi High Court has issued summons to SciHub and LibGen in a copyright infringement suit brought about by Elsevier UK, Wiley India, Wiley Periodicals USA, and American Chemical Society (read Swaraj’s post on the same, summarized and linked above).
- Nashik has been accorded a GI tag for its wine.
- The date palm jaggery of Gajapati district in Odisha is reportedly likely to get a GI tag soon.
- Google was asked to block 158 instant financing apps on its Play Store by the Telangana police after the companies behind these were found harassing and shaming defaulters.
News from around the World
- The Enola Holmes lawsuit between the Conan Doyle Estate and Netflix, involving the question of copyrightability of the emotions of Sherlock Holmes’ character has been dismissed with prejudice by the US’s District Court of New Mexico.
- England & Wales Court of Appeal reaffirmed the ruling of the High Court of London holding that Bentley Motors had infringed the registered ‘BENTLEY’ trademark of Bentley Clothing by using an identical trademark on its clothing line.
- Google has signed ‘individual agreements’ on copyright payments with French newspapers and magazines including Le Monde, Le Figaro and Liberation, for the purpose of sharing revenues from the display of news in search results.
The Legality of the Appointment of the 5 Technical Members to the IPAB
Prashant Reddy, one of our most prolific bloggers, is back with a guest post, questioning the legality of the appointment of the 5 Technical Members made to the IPAB earlier this year.
The Legality of the Appointment of the 5 Technical Members to the IPAB
Prashant Reddy
Continuing from Praharsh’s earlier post on the Supreme Court’s judgment on the legality of the Tribunal Rules, 2020, I would like to briefly comment on the legality of the appointments of the 5 Technical Members to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB).
Earlier this year, the Government hurriedly made appointments of 5 Technical Members to the IPAB after the IDMA sued the Government before the Delhi High Court on the non-functioning of the IPAB. At the time I had written a short post explaining how those appointments may not have been entirely legal because the initial advertisement process had taken place under one set of rules and the appointment orders were issued under a different set of rules. I have been doing a little research on this point and wanted to fill in some of the blanks in my earlier post.
The Advertisements
The advertisements for the appointments of the 5 Technical Members were published on July 25, 2018. The advertisement noted that the Government was following the eligibility and qualification criteria as laid down by the Supreme Court in its orders dated 9th February, 2018, 22nd February, 2018 and 20th March, 2018 in W.P.(C) No. 279 of 2017 which had been filed challenging the constitutionality of The Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017 (Tribunal Rules, 2017). These orders of the Supreme Court operated as a de facto stay of the tribunal rules under challenge, since the Supreme Court as an interim measure allowed the Selection Process to continue under the legislation that existed prior to the enactment of the Tribunal Rules, 2017 under the Finance Act, 2017 (the orders can be accessed here, here and here).
The Selection Committee Meeting
On 31st August, 2019 the Selection Committee met and shortlisted 5 of the applicants, who responded to the advertisements, for the posts of Technical Members at IPAB. As per normal procedure, the recommendations of the Selection Committee are forwarded to the Appointments Committee, Cabinet (ACC) for its approval. Only after the ACC agrees with the recommendation, can the Central Government issue formal appointment orders. While the recommendations were pending at the ACC, the Supreme Court in the Roger Mathews case dated 13th November, 2019, declared the Tribunal Rules, 2017 to be unconstitutional and struck down the rules in their entirety. Technically, this judgment would not have affected the appointment process initiated on July 25, 2018 because the entire appointment process was being conducted under the law that existed prior to the Tribunal Rules, 2017.
The Tribunal Rules, 2020
A few months later on 12th February, 2020, the Central Government notified the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2020 under Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 to replace the rules that were struck down by the Supreme Court on 13th November, 2019. These rules which were notified on 12th February, 2020 were upheld in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court, with some riders, as explained by Praharsh in his post.
The ACC Appointment
On 21st July, 2020, almost 5 months after the new Tribunal Rules came into effect and after IDMA’s lawsuit before the Delhi High Court, the ACC issued an order approving the recommendations made by Selection Committee on 31st August, 2019. This order however stated that the appointments were being made under the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2020 (‘Tribunal Rules, 2020’).
The Legality of the Appointments
This is where things get problematic.
First, under the Tribunal Rules, 2020, practising lawyers can be appointed to the IPAB as Technical Members only if they have 25 years of experience in copyright or trademarks, depending on the role for which they are being appointed. While the DIPP has refused, under the RTI Act, to share the CVs of the 5 persons appointed as Technical Members, it is quite obvious from reading the bios of the Technical Members on the website of the IPAB that most of them (not all) do not appear to have the 25 years of experience required under the 2020 rules. They clearly could not have been appointed under the Tribunal Rules, 2020 and this is not surprising because the Selection Committee had selected them on the basis of the qualification criteria laid in the law prior to the Tribunal Rules, 2017.
Second, presuming that the appointments were made under the law that existed prior to the 2017 rules, the entire process of advertisement, selection and appointment should have been completed prior to the notification of the new Tribunal Rules, 2020 on 12th February, 2020 because the moment the Tribunal Rules, 2020 came into effect in February, the legal framework under which the advertisement in 2018 were issued ceased to exist. In this case, the Selection Committee meetings took place before 12th February, 2020 but the legal process is not completed until the appointment orders are issued. In this case the appointment orders were issued sometime after the ACC’s meeting on 21st July, 2020. How can appointment orders be issued when the entire legal regime under which the appointments were made, ceased to exist post the notification of the new Tribunal Rules, 2020? The answer is simple – the appointments were clearly illegal. The correct course of action would have been to re-advertise the posts after the new tribunal rules came into effect on 12th February, 2020.
There is little doubt that the appointments of all 5 Technical Members will be quashed, if challenged before a High Court. It is however unlikely that anybody from the IP bar is going to challenge those appointments.
Sci-Hub and Libgen Up against Academic Publishers: A Death Knell for Access to Research? – Part I
Recently, Elsevier, Wiley, and American Chemical Society have filed a copyright infringement suit in the Delhi High Court against two groups of websites going by the names ‘Sci-Hub’ and ‘Libgen’. The plaintiffs have sought for a permanent injunction against the websites and for issuing a dynamic injunction order so that the mirror links of these websites can be blocked as and when the plaintiffs notify. Additionally, the plaintiffs have sought an interim injunction against the defendants as well. In a hearing that took place on December 24, the court refused to grant a relief of removing the alleged infringing links from the defendant websites noting that there was no urgency as the alleged infringement had been going on since 2011. However, in light of the stand of Sci-Hub’s counsel, the court ordered that “no new articles or publications, in which the plaintiffs have copyright, will be uploaded or made available”. Libgen was unrepresented in this hearing. In this three-part post, I seek to dissect this litigation and the interpretive issues before the court. I shall also briefly touch upon the implications of this litigation on the education and research sector in India.
Parties
The three plaintiffs in this case are “top-tier, global publishing houses in the field of scientific and academic publications”. While all the plaintiffs have some portion of their publications available as open access, the predominant model for them is the subscription model where they earn revenue through subscriptions to their publications. Defendant No. 1, Alexandra Elbakyan, is a Kazakhstan based computer programmer and the owner of the group of websites popularly known as Sci-Hub. Sci-Hub’s stated aim is to “provide mass and public access to tens of millions of research papers” in order to remove “barriers in the way of science”, and contains a library of over 85 million papers. Defendant No. 2, on the other hand, is a group of websites known by the name Library Genesis or Libgen, whose owners are unknown. It claims to be a links aggregator to guide a user on where to find a given article/ book and has access to over 84 million journal articles and 2.8 million textbooks.
Charges
The plaintiffs claim that their publications fall within the ambit of literary works and that they hold exclusive rights to the same including the individual pieces published by them in light of their agreements with the original authors. Particularly, the plaintiffs invoke their exclusive rights as provided in Sections 14(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the Copyright Act (the ‘Act’). These rights concern the reproduction of the work, issuing copies of the work to the public, and to communicate the concerned work to the public. They claim that the defendants by making the plaintiffs’ works available on their website without due permission are thus infringing these works by impairing their exercise of their exclusive rights. They specifically invoke liability under 51(a), 51(b)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the Act. Section 51(a)(i) concerns committing of an act that is within the copyright owner’s exclusive domain. The other provisions, however, hinge on a profit or a trade motive on part of the infringer, or causing prejudice to the copyright owner. Additionally, the plaintiffs have invoked liability of the defendants under Sections 65A and 65B of the Act. These provisions concern circumvention of technological protection measures deployed by the copyright owner and the removal of rights management information from the work.
Rogue Websites and Dynamic Injunctions
The plaintiffs heavily rely on the decision in UTV Software Communication Ltd. v. 1337X.TO for seeking the defendant websites to be blocked and for a dynamic injunction to be issued against the same. In UTV, the Delhi High Court went into extensive detail on the issue of digital piracy and its impact on the movie industry. Pertinently, it delved into the question of when a website has to be blocked in its entirety as against a specific URL that contains the alleged infringing content. To this end, the court noted the significant impact that blocking of a website might have and hence the remedy has to be used with caution. Accordingly, the court only allowed it to be used against certain websites that it termed to be as ‘rogue’ websites.
The court listed out nine suggestive, non-exhaustive factors to categorise a website as ‘rogue’ in nature. These factors are: (i) primary purpose of the website being copyright infringement; (ii) flagrancy of the infringement; (iii) hidden or non-traceable details of the website registrant; (iv) ignorance of take down notices; (v) the presence of directories, indexes or categories of the means to infringe; (vi) the general disregard to copyright by the owner; (vii) blocking of access to the website by other jurisdictions; (viii) presence of instructions on circumventing measures and court orders blocking access to the website; and (ix) the traffic on the websites. Per these factors, the website need not itself be carrying out the infringement, rather it also includes websites facilitating such infringement.
It would be interesting to see how the court tests the present case on these criteria. Some of the factors including blocking by other jurisdictions, the extent of traffic, non-traceability of website owners, presence of indexes and categories, and ignorance of take down notices prima facie weigh in against the defendants. Similarly the regular updates of mirror links to access the websites could be seen as instructions on circumventing court orders. As to the general disregard of copyright law, the same also weighs slightly against the defendants. However, other factors require strict analysis by the court during the trial to determine the nature of material available on these websites. As Prof. Scaria points out, a lot of material on these websites might actually not be hit by copyright law such as works in which copyright has expired or those where the right vests in the author in which the publishers do not have any claim to begin with. As the plaintiffs have only provided a short illustrative list, a clear conclusion on the primary purpose of the website or the flagrancy of infringement requires a more thorough treatment. It has to be considered that the court in UTV itself had stated that the classification of a website as ‘rogue’ was a qualitative endeavour that requires establishment that the given website is “overwhelmingly infringing”. A sample size of hundred or so articles might not be sufficient to establish infringement to this extent when the total scope of works runs over 84 million each.
Another allied issue that has to be addressed is that of granting a dynamic injunction as a remedy by the court. The court in UTV suggested it to be granted to stop what it termed as ‘hydra headed’ rogue websites that merely provide mirror links upon being blocked. In such circumstances, the court stated that the plaintiffs could implead the “mirror/redirect/alphanumeric websites under Order I Rule 10 CPC in the event they merely provide new means of accessing the same primary infringing websites that have been injuncted”. The power of supervision over the process was granted to the Joint Registrar, taking away the judicial oversight. This remedy becomes particularly problematic in the case at hand where there possibly exist a large number of non-infringing content on the concerned websites. If supposed the websites are blocked and they subsequently come up with an alphanumeric website hosting merely non-infringing content, the plaintiffs might even get them shut down given the broad leeway provided by a dynamic injunction, despite its emphasis on infringing works. Moreover, as we have discussed earlier on the blog, courts have not been particularly careful in structuring the dynamic injunction orders and have given broad-worded reliefs that can misused by the plaintiffs, thereby unreasonably constraining free speech. In this light, it is particularly important for the care to approach this plea with caution.
With this background on the arguments raised by the plaintiffs in this dispute, I shall highlight the applicability of a fair dealing defence in Part II of this post (here). Part III (here) would then deal with the exemption for education in the Act and the relief of interim injunction sought by the plaintiffs.
Sci-Hub and Libgen Up against Academic Publishers: A Death Knell for Access to Research? – Part II
This post is in continuation to my previous post (here) discussing the copyright infringement suit filed by academic publishers against Sci-Hub and Libgen, particularly the dynamic injunction sought by the plaintiffs. Here, I discuss the applicability of a fair dealing defence for the defendant websites in the instant dispute.
Fair Dealing
Even if the court rules that the defendant websites were indulging in activities amounting to copyright infringement, it is necessary for the court to examine whether such use would be covered by any of the exceptions provided under Section 52 of the Copyright Act. The most interesting discussion towards this end would be the exception provided under Section 52(1)(a) of the Act. The relevant provision is as reproduced below:
“(a) a fair dealing with any work, not being a computer programme, for the purpose of—
(i) private or personal use, including research;”
This provision thus allows for acts to not constitute infringement if they are done for the purposes of private use that includes research, provided that there is ‘fair dealing’ with the work. In this regard, the court must need to discuss two issues: first, whether the defendant websites’ use can be considered ‘fair dealing’, and second, whether this provision includes facilitation of research within its ambit. I shall now discuss them in that order.
With regards to the issue of ‘fair dealing’, as I have examined earlier, the Delhi High Court in India TV Independent News Service Pvt. Ltd. v. Yashraj Films Pvt. Ltd. has incorporated the four-factor test used in the US to interpret fair dealing. These factors are:
“(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”
Purpose and Character of Use
In the instant case, the purpose of use of the copyrighted works by the defendants is to ensure adequate access to paywalled articles to facilitate research. This falls squarely within the ambit of a ‘non-profit educational purpose’. The possible counter to this point that the plaintiffs have provided in the plaint is that the websites are aimed at profit-making given the substantially high donations that they have received. This, however, appears to be a very flawed approach of assessing the purpose of any use. Per this understanding, if I tomorrow provide free food to those who require it, and being impressed my actions someone provides me a gift or a donation to support my efforts, my entire endeavour would be termed as a commercial venture which is absurd. The donations do not take away from the fact that ‘purpose’ for which the use is being carried out by the defendants is indeed non-commercial and educational in nature.
The character of use, on the other hand, is a tricky question to assess. Admittedly the defendants are uploading the entirety of the articles as it is, there is a considerable difference in terms of the manner in which the work is being used. The websites provide a much more conveniently searchable database to access these works and all of that at a single portal, alongside its efficient search algorithm and easy downloads. This manner in which the works are used is much different from the original source, and is similar to the value addition by several paid databases such as JSTOR or HeinOnline. Its utility could be seen from the fact that even those with duly licensed access to various academic journals, use Sci-Hub in staggering numbers to access the same. It might, thus, be considered a transformative use of the work, and is a question the court should explicitly adjudicate upon.
Nature of the Work and Substantiality of Copying
The nature of the work involved is more factual than creative. Admittedly, there is certain creative element with which academic books and articles are written in that they bring in fresh perspectives to research, on a factual-creative spectrum they are closer to the former than the latter. The second factor, thus, might weigh in marginally in the defendants’ favour. The third factor, however, weighs against the defendant as the defendants are copying the entirety of the original work while putting it up on their website.
Effect on Potential Market
This final factor is the one that warrants for the most interesting discussion. The defendant websites have been present since over a decade where as per the plaintiffs almost the entirety of their copyrighted stuff has been made available for free. Despite this, there has barely been much impact on the revenues of the plaintiffs due to the same. Take, for instance, the specific case of Elsevier, which probably has the biggest stakes involved of the three. The statistics on the revenue and profits of Elsevier in the past few years (see here, here, and here) highlight that it has had a constant 2% growth rate in its revenues. In 2019 itself, its operating profits rose by 3% to reach a staggering figure of £982m. The higher profit growth rate compared to the revenue growth rate also indicates a fall in operating costs possibly due to greater shift to online publications than offline subscriptions. Moreover, these figures also indicate that the profit margins at which Elsevier operates hover around 37-38%. These staggering profit margins, even surpassing the likes of Apple, Google, and Amazon, make academic publishing as one of the most profitable industries in the world. (See here, here, here, and here. The readers might also refer to this interesting documentary explaining the “business of scholarship”.) This indicates that its commercial success has only been rising to exponential heights.
The reasonably possible reason behind the same would be the fact that the population that uses means such as the defendants’ websites is the one which would never use the plaintiffs’ services without that. For instance, if a student in a University has to write an academic paper and the University does not subscribe to these prominent databases, the student would rather write a non-contemporary article based on the highly limited material available in a library as against paying for the plaintiff’s databases to access state-of-the art research. This stems from the enormous costs involved in accessing these databases to the point that a single paper would cost thousands of rupees to an individual which majority of the population, especially in India, cannot afford. As the court noted with respect to academic publishers in the DU Photocopy Case, the market of such publishers is markedly different. In case of the plaintiffs, similarly, their target audience are the libraries that subscribe to their publications as against independent researchers or students that access defendant websites. In such light, this fourth factor would definitely weigh in favour of the defendants.
‘For the Purpose of’ Research
If upon an analysis of the above factors, the court concludes that defendants’ use in deed amounts to ‘fair dealing’, the next question would be to see if it falls within the scope of sub-section (a)(i). This provision allows for an exception to infringement if the use is ‘for the purpose of’, inter alia, private or personal research. The question that then arises is how the term ‘for the purpose of’ in this section should be interpreted. There are two possible interpretations to it. On the one hand it could be constructed in a very narrow manner to mean that this signifies that only the individual who is using the concerned copyrighted work is allowed to claim this exemption and not a third party that facilitates such access. The other interpretation to it is that anyone who facilitates use of a copyrighted work for research would also be able to claim this exception. The ordinary meaning of the term thus leads to certain ambiguity and secondary sources need to be looked at. Merriam-Webster defines ‘purpose’ to mean “something set up as an object or end to be attained”. Similar definitions are provided by other dictionaries such as Collins and Macmillan. These definitions accord a wide scope to include facilitation of research also within its ambit. Moreover, as the Delhi High Court in Wiley Eastern Ltd. v. Indian Institute of Management explained, “the basic purpose of Section 52 is to protect the freedom of expression under Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India- so that research, private study, criticism or review or reporting of current events could be protected.” This rationale behind the provision also supports a broad reading of the provision to include facilitation of private study or research. Interestingly, a similar argument was made in the case of Rupendra Kashyap v. Jiwan Publishing House in the context of publication of past year CBSE papers. The court denied this argument with the following reasoning:
“But, if a publisher publishes a book for commercial exploitation and in doing so infringes a Copyright, the defense under section 52(1)(a)(i) would not be available to such a publisher though the book published by him may be used or be meant for use in research or private study.”
Thus, the essence behind such rejection was not the fact that the provision was being invoked by a facilitator of research but the fact that such facilitator was using it for commercial gains. This indicates that the rationale was hinging more on the fact that the dealing was unfair in light of commercial exploitation. This is how two subsequent cases, them being Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. v. Chintamani Rao, and Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. v. Hamar Television Network Pvt. Ltd., have interpreted Jiwan Publishing House. They both note:
“In respect of the defence of fair dealing, the Court applied the test of “commercial exploitation” and observed that if a publisher commercially exploits the original work, and in doing so, infringes the copyright, the defence of fair dealing would not be available to such a publisher, even if the book published by him is used, or meant to be used for research of private study.”
In light of these decisions, it appears that the provision could be interpreted to include such use of works that facilitates research. In such a scenario, the court’s decision in this case would then depend heavily on how it appreciates the various factors of ‘fair dealing’ as highlighted above. It must be noted that if the fair dealing argument of the defendants is accepted by the court, this would not set a particularly dangerous precedent as some might fear. This is because the assessment will be particular to the facts at hand which themselves are peculiar in nature. The two features that distinguish this case from other concerns of piracy are the non-profit nature of the venture and the lack of impact on the owner’s market which is not met in any other piracy case. As an aside, even in the UTV case while assessing the website blocking and granting dynamic injunction, the court specifically noted the severe impact of digital piracy on the movie industry, which is far from being the case at hand.
With this discussion on the applicability of the fair dealing defence in this post, and the background on the litigation and the dynamic injunction plea in Part I (here), in Part III (here) I shall deal with the exemption for education in the Copyright Act and the relief of interim injunction sought by the plaintiffs.
Sci-Hub and Libgen Up against Academic Publishers: A Death Knell for Access to Research? – Part III
This post is in continuation of my previous posts dealing with the background on the copyright infringement suit against Sci-Hub and Libgen (here) and the applicability of the fair dealing defence (here). In this post, I discuss the exemption in the Copyright Act for the purposes of education and the interim injunction plea sought by the plaintiffs.
Education Exemption
Section 52(1)(i) of the Act allows for “the reproduction of any work” “by a teacher or a pupil in the course of instruction”. This provision was the focus of attention of the landmark DU Photocopy decision. The Division Bench had interpreted it to hold that so long as any given work is necessary for the purposes of educational instruction, reproduction of such work is permissible. This essentially means that if, for instance, the plaintiff’s works are necessary for educational instruction, copies of the same can be made by students for their use. Moreover, the Division Bench also specified that the use of any intermediary or agency by the concerned student or teacher for carrying out this copying would be permissible within this provision. The caveat, however, that the court provided was the incorporation of the element of fairness under this provision. It held that this fairness has to be “determined on the touchstone of ‘extent justified by the purpose’” and that “so much of the copyrighted work can be fairly used which is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the use i.e. make the learner understand what is intended to be understood.”
Applying this rationale to the present case, the defendant websites can potentially be seen as intermediaries that provide access to works that are necessary in the course of instruction. This, however, would be a difficult argument to make for the defendants. This is because in a sense they will have to establish the necessity of each work that they have stored on their database for some instruction or the other. Moreover, it might also be contested on the grounds that under this claim the access to works should be restricted to only those for which it is necessary. For instance, it is difficult to argue why a law student necessarily requires access to scientific articles on nanotechnology.
Even if this exemption is deemed to be inapplicable, another factor needs to be considered. If the court decides against the defendants in this case, that will mean that the applicability of this exception will become minimal. As Divij has explained earlier, the academic publishing industry is already skewed against access for individual researchers, students, and the scientific community at large. Furthermore, a recent piece in Scroll on this litigation aptly highlights the necessity of the defendant websites for academia to tackle the challenges posed by this exploiting structure of publishing agencies. (Also see here) This challenge is stark even for those institutions with above-average access to subscribed databases. For instance, even for writing this post, I could not access some of the authoritative commentaries on copyright law for analysis, despite having significantly higher access to resources through my University than non-institutional researchers, and the exorbitant costs to buy an individual copy. The excessive costs of subscription charged by publishing houses has led to libraries around the world highlighting their inability to afford them, including Harvard in the past. (See here, here, here, here, here, and most recently here and here) Even the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, India’s largest science body, has had affordability difficulties in subscribing to major academic journals. As an aside, a detailed research on the availability of library budgets in Indian universities and the concerns on affordability of major databases within the same will be an interesting exercise. The figures for the top 3 NIRF ranked universities in Law, Medical, and Engineering share some interesting insights. For instance, the approximate expenditure on library in 2018-19 ranges from 30 lakhs to 2.4 crores in Law, 5.4 crores to 28.5 crores in Medical, and 16 crores to 19.5 crores in Engineering, in the top 3 ranked universities. These figures, however, offer a limited insight given their vast range and non-contextualised presentation as factors like receipt of external donations, extent of prior availability of resources, and segregation of expenditure on books and academic journals, significantly affects the viability of spending.
The impact of such an outcome would be exactly contrary to what the Jammu and Kashmir High Court had warned against, citing an earlier Lahore court decision, in the case of Romesh Chowdhry v. Kh. Ali Mohamad Nowsheri. The court had observed as follows:
“The Principle is now well settled that under the guise of a copyright the authors cannot ask the court to close all the doors of research and scholarship and all frontiers of human knowledge”
It is in order to prevent such an outcome that the exemptions on research and education have been provided by the Act. However, the exploitative structures of academic publishing houses coupled with the particular socio-economic conditions of India with limited access to education, internet, and other resources, make the presence of such exemptions in the Act futile. (See Swaraj’s post for more perspective on this issue)
Interim Injunction
The plaintiffs in the instant case have sought for an interim injunction to be granted taking down the defendant websites. While the court did not grant the said injunction in the previous hearing noting the lack of urgency, the short notice to the defendants and the time required for next hearing might have played a role in not granting the relief. As the IA is yet to be disposed of and this plea would mostly be raised by the plaintiffs in subsequent proceedings, the court must approach it carefully. In order for an interim injunction to be granted, three factors need to be established: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparably harm. In the instant case, as I have highlighted above, there are a lot of complex issues that the court has to unpack. In this context, it would be hard to arrive at even a prima facie conclusion as to the strength of the plaintiff’s case. Even if it is assumed that the prima facie case is established, which many might think to be satisfied, the other two factors have to be independently assessed. As has been examined above, it is difficult to envision any irreparable harm to be caused to the plaintiffs if the injunction is denied, in light of their constantly rising revenues despite over a decade of the existence of the websites. Accordingly, the balance of convenience also possibly weighs against the plaintiffs, especially since the shutting down of the website would mean the prohibition on access to scientific research. Moreover, as I have examined in a previous post, while deciding upon an injunction application, the delay in approaching courts for seeking such an injunction must be treated to be inversely proportional to the possibility of success. As the plaintiffs have approached the courts after almost a decade of the existence of defendant websites, their probability of securing the interim injunction should be minimal. Therefore, the court should be wary of granting any relief until the trial is completed and the facts and law have been thoroughly examined.
Conclusion
The outcome of this litigation can be monumental for the shape that India’s research and education sector will take in times to come. In examining this critical matter, the court must keep the basic principles of copyright law in mind. As I have examined earlier, taking help of Landes and Posner’s conceptualisation of copyright as a balance between access and incentives, the public element of copyright deserves adequate attention. Presently, there do not appear to be any lack of incentives on the part of academic publishers in publishing contemporary research as can be seen from the humongous profit margins that they have. Rather, they themselves only play a facilitative role of giving voice to the research of those actually writing the concerned papers. Any concerns of incentivisation should rather focus on the authors of these works or the peer reviewers both of which play a more substantial role than the rather mechanical aspect of the publisher’s work. A downfall of this litigation going against the defendant would be the outright elimination of access to contemporary research for the numerous researchers or even students in the country. This goes against the stark purpose of copyright law to begin with. Moreover, this takes away the entire point of having academic discourse in the first place. This is because academic works will then have minimal potential in influencing modern debates on policy reforms and would turn into utopian fantasies of those sitting in institutional ivy towers. It can only be hoped that the court factors in the different considerations of a developing nation like India as against the developed nations where the defendant websites have presently been blocked, for it will have a massive impact on the research potential of the country.
Copyright and the Sci-Hub/Libgen Case: A Constitutional Query
By now, most readers are likely to be aware of the case against the shadow libraries Sci-Hub and LibGen, by three publishing houses. We had a post questioning why ‘poorer’ countries were still allowing copyright law to act as a hindrance to development here, and a three-part post looking into the case against Sci-Hub and LibGen, the fair dealing exception and the education use exception here, here and here. We’re pleased to now bring you an incisive post by Saral Minocha looking into questions of constitutionality that this dispute may raise. Saral is a graduate from NLU Delhi (2017). After working in a law firm for a couple of years, he is now teaching at CLAT Possible.
Copyright and the Sci-Hub/Libgen Case: A Constitutional Query
Saral Minocha
The conflict between copyright law and the right to receive information is now starkly visible. In the ongoing litigation in the Delhi High Court pertaining to shadow libraries Libgen and Sci-Hub, the plaintiffs (three publication houses that publish books, journals and academic articles, namely Elsevier, Wiley and ACM) have filed a suit seeking the direction that these shadow libraries be blocked on grounds of copyright infringement. Whether these shadow libraries are committing copyright infringement and whether an injunction must follow is in the domain of copyright law and laws pertaining to civil relief. I do not propose to examine that issue. I want to take a step back and examine whether our copyright law is in line with our constitutional scheme.
An inquiry of an allegation that a law violates the fundamental right to free speech, guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, goes as follows: it first needs to be proven that the law restricts the right provided in Article 19(1)(a); if that venture succeeds, then it is on the State to prove that the restriction, first, has basis in one or more of the grounds provided in Article 19(2), and second, is reasonable. It is my submission that an interpretation of our copyright law that allows the plaintiffs to prevail in this ongoing litigation restricts the right to free speech as granted in Article 19(1)(a), and that such restriction does not have basis in any ground in Article 19(2).
Restriction on the Right to Freedom of Speech?
The right that is immediately affected by the banning of these shadow libraries is the right to receive information, which has been interpreted as a part of Article 19(1)(a). As is evidenced in the abovementioned ongoing litigation, if the suit succeeds, then because of copyright law, the general public would not be able to receive information. Thus, copyright law does restrict the right to receive information, and hence Article 19(1)(a). Of course, one may make an argument that the general public is still free to pay the fee required by the publishers for accessing materials available freely on these shadow libraries, but given the steepness of the fee, most of the general public would effectively not receive this information at all. [The argument here pertains only to educational materials – books, journals, research articles, documentaries etc. While there may be constitutional issues pertaining to other subject matter covered by copyright law, that is beyond the scope of this piece.]
In this regard, one might take the example of American jurisprudence on this issue to argue that speech that infringes copyright is not protected under the right to free speech. In the US, it has been held by the Supreme Court that copyright law does not infringe the First Amendment right to free speech. However, the argument that speech infringing copyright is unprotected is not an attractive argument with respect to the Indian Constitution. The structure of the right to free speech in the First Amendment is such that the Court itself is free to find the grounds on which it can be restricted – which it has. The US Supreme Court has developed grounds on which speech can be restricted – clear and present danger, obscenity etc. However, the structure of the right in India is different – the Court is not left free to determine grounds on which the right granted under Article 19(1)(a) can be restricted; the Court is bound by the grounds for restrictions provided in Article 19(2). If a law has a direct and inevitable impact on the right granted in Article 19(1)(a), it is said to restrict such right. The direct and inevitable impact is starkly visible in the ongoing litigation.
Reasonable Restriction under Article 19(2)?
Article 19(2) has the following grounds on which restrictions to the right to free speech in Article 19(1)(a) can be made: “sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality,… contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence”. Of these the only grounds that appear to be justifying copyright law are friendly relations with foreign states, decency and morality.
Friendly Relations with Foreign States
Perhaps a feeble argument could be made using “friendly relations with foreign states”. One could make an argument that not implementing copyright law would lead India to violate the TRIPS Agreement, thereby causing harm to “friendly relations with foreign states”. If this argument is accepted, however, then the Parliament would be free to enter into any international treaty providing for restrictions on speech, and then claim that treaty as a ground for restricting free speech. Surely the Parliament’s power to enter into international agreements (and thereby create relations with other states) is limited by the right to free speech; any other position could give the Parliament a carte blanche to impose any restrictions whatsoever on free speech.
Decency or Morality
Coming back to decency and morality: till now, they have been invoked in relation to obscenity and some cases pertaining to election laws. One may make an argument that it would be immoral for person X to commercially exploit person Y’s creative work, and since copyright law prevents this from taking place, copyright law is squarely covered by this ground. It needs to be noted that “morality” is now interpreted as constitutional morality and not public morality, the scope of which is unclear. At least one aspect of constitutional morality has been implicitly, if not directly, identified by the Supreme Court. In Navtej Singh Johar, the Court relied upon the notions of equality and anti-discrimination as being important values that guide constitutional morality to hold that section 377 of the Indian Penal Code was unconstitutional insofar as it criminalized consensual sex between two adults of the same sex. In the question of whether our copyright law passes the test of constitutional morality, are equality and anti-discrimination relevant like they were in Navtej Singh Johar?
In this analysis of “morality” one would have to evaluate the moral counterweights to copyright law. Is it moral to take refuge behind copyright law and impose difficult paywalls to educational content? In our country, where access to education is linked to one’s class membership, and where education is correlated to social mobility, realities of life are affected by education. SpicyIP has also covered in a past piece affordability difficulties faced by even the best of educational institutions in India. In this reality, surely, the answer to the question asked at the beginning of this paragraph would be an emphatic no.
Therefore, at least to the extent that our copyright law prohibits access to educational materials, it is not moral. It follows then that to the extent that our copyright law prohibits access to educational materials, it is not covered by the ground of “decency and morality” in Article 19(2).
Of course, given the amorphous nature of the words “decency and morality”, the Court can do some interpretational gymnastics to hold that copyright law is moral, but I hope that the Court also evaluates the moral counterweights to the need of protecting original works.
The Balancing Approach
There is also a line of argument according to which fundamental rights in conflict can be “balanced”. That line of argument has found favour with the Indian Supreme Court as well. Without commenting on the merits of balancing Article 19(1)(a) rights with other rights, it is important to see what rights can potentially be in conflict with Article 19(1)(a) in the context of copyright law. One such right is the right to property under Article 300A. Given the constitutional scheme, though, a fundamental right should trump the right to property, and a question of balancing would not even arise.
Another such right could be the right to trade under Article 19(1)(g), using which publishing houses and other copyright owners may make an argument that their business is dependent entirely on exclusivity (and hence copyright). However, the Article 19(1)(g) right is not absolute, and can be restricted on the wide ground of “public interest”. If one accepts the morality argument in the previous part of this article, then it is obvious to see that access to educational materials is in public interest – access to educational materials leads to better access to education for those who cannot ordinarily access it, and then to better chances of social mobility. Any argument raised by the plaintiffs in the ongoing litigation pertaining to their right in Article 19(1)(g) can, therefore, be repelled by taking refuge in the public interest exception in Article 19(6). Therefore, in the context of availability of educational materials, the balancing-with-Article 19(1)(g) argument is a non-starter.
For the sake of completion, it is also important to note that it is not as if the drafters of the Constitution were unaware of copyright. The first copyright legislation in India was enacted in 1914, i.e. much before the enactment of the Constitution. Further, “copyright” is in fact mentioned in the 49th entry in List I of the Seventh Schedule. However, since legislations are “subject to the provisions of the Constitution”, an argument that copyright law is valid because the framers of the Constitution envisaged copyright law is also a non-starter; copyright law has to be subject to Article 19(1)(a) not just because of Article 13 (which provides that laws infringing fundamental rights are void to the extent of infringement), but also because of Article 245 (which provides for power of Parliament to legislate).
The Way Ahead
Irrespective of how this litigation ends, the conversation that it has triggered about the link between copyright law and free speech rights must be continued. This conversation can lead to two solutions: First, an amendment in copyright law that either compels copyright owners to make educational materials available at a reasonable cost (a statutory license scheme?) or clarifies the exceptions to copyright infringement to the effect that research is not inhibited by exercise of copyright. Second, the Constitution can be amended to include “copyright” as a ground in Article 19(2). As things stand in the Constitution, however, I submit that to the extent that our copyright law inhibits research, it invalidly restricts the right in Article 19(1)(a), and therefore, to that extent, it is void. The ongoing litigation, therefore, must, on constitutional grounds if not copyright-related grounds, be decided in the favour of the defendants.
Author’s note: I would like to acknowledge Swaraj Barooah, Dr. Arul Scaria, Shrutanjaya Bhardwaj and Aishwarya Kane for their inputs on this post.
‘Jhund’ Injunction Order: Copyright and Personality Rights in Real Life Stories
We’re pleased to bring to you a guest post by Shivam Kaushik, analysing the Telangana High Court’s order granting an interim injunction restraining the release of the film ‘Jhund’ in October this year.
Shivam is a 5th year law student at Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi. He’s previously also written guest posts for us, titled ‘Copyright and Webinars: Ownership, Licensing and Fair Use’ , ‘Govt’s Draft Model Guidelines on Implementation of IPR Policy for Academic Institutions – A Critique‘, ‘Reengineering of the Requirement of Disclosure of Foreign Applications by the 2019 Patent Manual‘ and ‘Are Orbital Transfer Trajectories Patentable?‘
‘Jhund’ Injunction Order: Copyright and Personality Rights in a Real Life Stories
Shivam Kaushik
In October this year, the Telangana High Court in Super Cassettes Industries Pvt. Ltd. (T-Series) & Anr. v. Nandi Chinni Kumar & Ors. passed an interim injunction restraining the release of the movie ‘Jhund’ due to potential copyright and personality right infringement. An appeal against the order of injunction passed by the High Court was also dismissed by the Supreme Court last month, without hearing the case on merits. This post examines the Telangana High Court’s decision which deals with copyright and personality right over real-life events and the life story of a person.
Facts
The case pertains to one Akhilesh Paul (Defendant No. 1), who was once a petty criminal but later became the captain of the Indian team in the 2010 Homeless Football World Cup. That team led by Defendant No. 1 was coached by Vijay Barse (Defendant No. 2). Thereafter, Defendant No. 1 got into a ‘Life Story Rights Agreement’ with the Plaintiff Nandi Chinni Kumar and also issued a ‘No Objection Certificate’ along with a ‘Declaration Letter’ granting Plaintiff the exclusive right to make a biopic/ feature film on his real-life story. The Plaintiff, after some improvisation in the life story, got a script registered with the Telangana Cinema Writers Association. Meanwhile, T-Series/ Super Cassettes (Defendant No. 3) decided to make a biopic on the life of Defendant No. 2 titled as ‘Jhund’ (‘Film’). When the Plaintiff got wind of it, he sought injunction contending that he holds copyright over the true-life story and life events of the first Defendant.
High Court’s Decision
The High Court came to the conclusion that there are distinct similarities in the plot, depiction, the life and story of the protagonist of the Film with the registered script of ‘Slum Soccer’ (para 109 of the decision). The Court restrained the release of the film holding that the Plaintiff has shown a strong prima facie case as to the existence of a right and also a prima facie case as regards infringement (para 110).
Court’s Reasoning
The Court based its decision on two grounds. First, the admission of Defendant No. 3 where he admitted giving an amount to Defendant No. 1 to obtain rights to incorporate the character of 1st Defendant in the film. This monetary transaction was made after Defendant No. 1 had already assigned the same ‘exclusively’ to the Plaintiff. The Court reasoned that it cannot be doubted that Defendant No. 1 shared his life story with Defendant No. 3 which he had already shared with the Plaintiff too. Thus, there is a ‘a probability’ that the ideas, expression, manner, arrangement, additions or embellishment made by the Plaintiff to the life story events of the Defendant No. 1 came to the knowledge of Defendant No. 3 (paras10 & 89).
The second ground that the Court relied upon to support its conclusion was the ‘right of publicity’ of Defendant No. 1. The Court concluded that Defendant No. 1 is, prima facie, a celebrity sportsman therefore as per the dictum of the Delhi High Court in Titan Industries v. Ram Kumar Jewellers (2012) Defendant No. 1 has a commercial and proprietary interest in the profitability of his name or photograph. The Telangana High Court, relying on the right of publicity ruled that since the right of publicity of Defendant No. 1 was exclusively assigned to the Plaintiff, it appears that Defendant no. 3 prima facie violated it by making the movie (paras 95 & 96).
Analysis
The line of reasoning adopted by the High Court apparently seems unfeasible and erroneous. The first reason adopted by the Court appears to be too remote and far-fetched in light of the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films (1978), a judgment which the High Court has itself referred to in its decision. Similarity in plot, depiction, life and the life and story of protagonist is insufficient to constitute infringement. In R.G. Anand, the Supreme Court has lucidly elucidated that there can be no copyright in an idea, subject matter, themes, plot, or historical or legendary facts and violation of the copyright in such cases is confined to the form, manner and arrangement and expression of the idea by the author of the copyrighted work.
Even if for the sake of argument it is assumed that Defendant No. 1 did share the broad contours of the embellishments that the Plaintiff has made in his script to the life of Defendant no.1 and Defendant No. 3 incorporated them in his movie, the same cannot be called as infringement until the defendant’s work is a ‘literal imitation’ of the copyrighted work with some variations here and there, and the viewer after having seen both the works gets an unmistakable impression that the subsequent work appears to be a copy of the original as held in R.G. Anand. That the film’s story could be a substantial and material copy of the Plaintiff’s script is a near impossibility. Defendant No. 3 specifically pleaded before the Court that they had no access to Plaintiff’s script and it never was Plaintiff’s case that Defendant No. 3 had access to his script.
The second ground for grant of injunction also does not stand to scrutiny. The Plaintiff’s case was that his copyright in respect of the true-life story events of the Defendant No. 1 has been infringed and surprisingly, there is no submission on record (in the Court’s decision) of Plaintiff invoking/ dealing with personality rights. Despite this, the Court came to the conclusion that Defendant No. 3 violated Defendant No.1’s right of publicity, which had been assigned to the Plaintiff.
The right of publicity is not codified in India but grounded in several court decisions. Courts have regularly held that the publicity right arises from the right to privacy (also dubbed as the right to be let alone) and only the individual can profit from indicia personal to him/ her. Although, there exists an exception apropos life story, carved out by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N. (1994) wherein it held that there exists a right to publish life story insofar as it appears from public records without the consent of the person concerned. In such case, no concern of right to privacy arises; presumably because the information is no more private to the individual. This implies that only that which is not on the public record cannot be revealed. In the case at hand, it could be argued that the life story of Defendant No. 1 received heavy publicity when his life story was showcased in an episode of popular TV show ‘Satyamev Jayate’ and it became a part of public record, eroding the element of privacy and the publicity rights in it.
Conclusion
The Telangana High Court’s decision is a rare one discussing the critical question of copyright and personality rights in real life stories. The reasoning adopted by the Court in holding that copyright can exist in life stories looks unconvincing to me. Additionally, the decision does not even fit well in the broader puzzle of copyright jurisprudence. By essentially holding that facts already in public domain continue to be a proprietary concern, the decision unreasonably expands the scope of copyright and personality rights. The decision takes copyright protection a step further from the ‘expression’ dimension towards the ‘plot, story and idea’ dimension (just not there yet).
A Look Back at India’s Top IP Developments of 2020
(This post has been co-authored with SpicyIP Fellows Adyasha Samal, Anupriya Dhonchak and Nikhil Purohit.)
Here’s wishing all our readers a very happy, safe and healthy new year!
Unfortunately, many traditions worldwide had to be broken the past year, but here at SpicyIP we’re glad to continue our annual tradition of recounting all the significant developments that impacted the Indian IP landscape in 2020.
This year, we have divided these developments into four categories:
a) Top 10 IP Judgments/Orders (Topicality/Impact)
b) Top 10 IP Judgments/Orders (Jurisprudence/Legal Lucidity)
c) Top 10 IP Legislative and Policy Related Developments, and
d) Top 10 Other IP Developments
The decisions in the first category, i.e., Top 10 IP Judgments/Orders (Topicality/Impact) reflect those that we thought were important from a topical point of view and were covered by the media in some way owing to the importance of parties litigating or the issue being considered or for impact on industry and innovation/creativity ecosystem etc. We’ve tried to represent a diversity of subject matter also in this list, so we have a fair sprinkling of cases dealing with copyright, patents, trademarks, competition law etc.
And the decisions in the second category, i.e., Top 10 IP Judgments/Orders (Jurisprudence/Legal Lucidity) reflect those that we thought reflected a fair bit of jurisprudential rigour and/or legal lucidity. However, the two categories are not mutually exclusive.
The third category lists out notable developments on the legislative and policy side and includes important amendments, proposals for amendments, release of policy notes and reports etc.
The other important developments which do not fall in any of the above three categories have been highlighted in the fourth category.
We have also included a list of other notable IP developments of 2020 here. You may also view the list of most read posts on the blog in 2020 here.
Before you read on and check if our top ten for 2020 matches yours, on this first day of the new year, let’s collectively hope that this year brings us more spicy IP developments which help shape India’s IP regime into a more fair, balanced and effective one.
Also, a huge thanks to our readers for continuing to engage with our posts and constantly encouraging us, which keeps us going!
A. Top 10 Judgments/Orders [Topicality/Impact]
1. Allani Ferid v. Assistant Controller of Patents & Designs (IPAB)
In a development that could change the patent law landscape as it relates to software patents, the IPAB allowed a patent application for a ‘method and device for accessing information sources and services on the web’ to Tunisian citizen Ferid Allani, 19 years after the original application was filed! In 2019, Justice Pratibha Singh of the Delhi High Court had issued an order directing the Patent Office to re-examine the application in the context of developments that have occurred since the filing of the patent in 1999. This refers to the addition of the phrase “per se” in section 3(k) of the Patents Act, which earlier barred computer programmes from being patented. The court had observed that this was done to ensure that genuine inventions that are developed based on computer programmes (as opposed to being only computer programmes) are not rejected. Thus, if the invention demonstrates a ‘technical effect’ or a ‘technical contribution’ it would be patentable even though it may be based on a computer program. The grant of this patent has opened the field for patent applications related to artificial intelligence, blockchain technologies and other digital products which may computer programme-based.
2. Astrazeneca AB & Anr. v. Emcure Pharma Ltd. & MSN Labs Ltd. & Astrazeneca v. Intas Pharma Ltd. & Alkem Labs Ltd. & (Delhi High Court)
Early in the year, the Delhi High Court granted an interim injunction against manufacture of generic version of cardiovascular diseases drug Ticagrelor by holding that even though the drug was covered by a previous genus patent owned by Astrazeneca, since it is produced and marketed under a species patent, the patentee is entitled to enforce the later species patent. This decision was controversially in contradiction with the previous rulings of the court as well as decisions rendered later in the year which have held that coverage and disclosure cannot be separate.
In November 2020, the Delhi High Court refused to grant an interim injunction against manufacture of generic version of anti-diabetic drug Dapagliflozin, which was argued by patentee Astrazeneca to have been disclosed only by a species patent even though it had been covered in an expired genus patent. In this well-reasoned judgment, the court reiterated that there cannot be any dichotomy between disclosure and coverage. It also noted that owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, patients already suffering from diabetes are at a greater risk of contracting coronavirus and thus, affordable diabetes medication was in public interest. The court also clarified that disclosure requirements had to be strictly followed by patent applicants.
3. Interdigital Tech Corp & Ors. v. Xiaomi Corp & Ors. (Delhi High Court)
In a significant development, the Delhi High Court rejected InterDigital’s proposal for constituting a two-tier confidentiality club for sharing confidential documents to assess whether the licensing terms being offered by InterDigital were on FRAND basis. This proposal sought to exclude any representatives of parties, “other than “non-in-house” advocates and the experts appointed by them”, from accessing documents like “confidential, comparable patent license agreements on FRAND terms, as executed by the parties in the suit”. The court held such a proposal to be against fair play to the defendants and against the lawyer-client relationship.
4. Prof. Dr. Cluadio De Simone & Anr. v. Actial Farmaceutica SRL. & Ors. (Delhi High Court)
In another significant development, the Delhi High Court provided clarity on the interplay between two different IP protections by observing that the same innovation cannot enjoy both trade secret and patent protection. The court rejected the Plaintiffs’ contention that the aspects of the innovation that they sought to protect as trade secrets were separate from the aspects that formed subject matter of their patent. It held that once a patent has been applied for and expired, the ‘innovation’ is in the public domain and no trade secret protection can be claimed thereon.
5. Monsanto Holdings Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Competition Commission of India (Delhi High Court)
The Delhi High Court ruled on the issue of overlap of jurisdiction under the Patents Act and the Competition Act in case of patent licensing terms that may be anti-competitive. It rejected the argument that the specialized regulator, i.e., the Patent Controller would be the one to first determine whether the agreements were an abuse of rights under the Patents Act before the CCI could look into it. The Controller did not have the power to act upon the exercise of patent rights or the agreements that are entered into by patentees with third parties in relation with these rights. Moreover, patents are not an industry in themselves and the grant of a patent merely recognizes an IP right. Thus, Section 3(5) of the Competition Act does not enable an IP right holder to include onerous conditions.
6. Arudra Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Pathanjali Ayurved Ltd. & Anr. (Madras High Court)
In an important judgment, the Madras High Court held that Patanjali’s use of the word ‘Coronil’ in its immunity booster tablets caused confusion regarding the possibility of curing coronavirus and played on the prevailing panic and fear among people to make money. Significantly, it ruled that this use infringed upon the Plaintiff’s registered trademark rights on ‘CORONIL’ under Section 29(4) of Trade Marks Act and interpreted the term ‘reputation in India’ under this section, literally. It stated that the Plaintiff simply needed to show that the trademark enjoys a reputation within the country and not meet the standard of fame held by a well-known mark. This interpretation of Section 29(4) allows for marks of significant repute in the domestic market to seek injunctions across classes without being subject to the onerous requirements of being declared a well-known mark under Section 2(zg). They are required to be known only amongst the relevant class of consumers as opposed to the general public.
7. Interdigital Tech Corp & Ors. v. Xiaomi Corp & Ors. (Delhi High Court)
The Delhi High Court (DHC) granted an anti anti-suit injunction in the patent infringement dispute between InterDigital and Xiaomi. The court viewed the lis as not impacting the proceedings before the Wuhan court concerning fixation of FRAND rates. The court noted Xiaomi’s argument to be predicated on comity of courts and held public policy concerns to trump the comity principle, considering the Wuhan judgment to be a direct impediment to its ability to decide the matter before it. The order was criticised for failing to consider the greater number of InterDigital’s patents in China than India, investigations against InterDigital’s policies in China in 2013, and strategic litigation against defendants in SEP disputes. Rajiv argued that the DHC ignored the public interest aspect that lies at core of a patent infringement suit.
8. Sameer Wadekar & Anr. v. Netflix Entertainment Services Pvt. Ltd. (Bombay High Court)
The Bombay High Court held that copyright protection subsists in the theme, plot and story line constituting the essence of a literary work. The plaintiff wrote a story titled ‘Singardaan’ in Urdu and alleged that the defendants’ web series under the identical title, ‘Singardaan’ launched on the App ‘Ullu’ and available on YouTube copied his story’s plot, narrative, characters and title. The court held that the web series contained all the essential parts of the story. It came to this conclusion noting that it would have been obvious to anyone who had read the story that the web series was only an adaptation of it. The interim order was criticised for its reasoning that the differences drawn up by the defendant between their web series and the plaintiff’s story were not crucial because they constituted ‘mere embellishments’ whereas the story line of the plaintiff was the ‘life and blood’ of the web series. This is because the ‘life and blood’ of the web series is irrelevant to a finding of substantial similarity and copyright infringement. Even if the web series had used the story as an ancillary trivial part of a larger plot whose ‘life and blood’ was something else, if the Court has concluded that the story used was a substantial part of the plaintiff’s copyrightable expression (as it had in this case), it would still result in a finding of infringement. The good thing about this order, though, was the Court’s candid acknowledgement of the difficulty in the ‘delicate task’ of applying the idea-expression dichotomy in practice, ultimately based on a value judgment of the right degree of abstraction.
9. Amazon Seller Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Amway India Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (Delhi High Court)
The decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court set aside the Single Judge’s order which had restrained various e-commerce platforms (including Amazon, Flipkart and Snapdeal) from enabling sale of products of ‘direct selling’ companies without their consent. The case concerned the applicability of the 2016 Direct Selling Guidelines (DSGs), Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, and contentions regarding inducement of breach of contract and tortious interference. The Court held that the DSGs are not law, and are only advisory in nature. Further, it noted that the mere fact that the online platforms may have knowledge of the Code of Ethics of the DSEs and the contractual stipulations imposed by such Direct Selling Entitiess, is insufficient to lay a claim of tortious interference.
10. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr. (Supreme Court)
Adding to an existing trail of decisions on administration of tribunals, the Supreme Court passed a detailed judgement in November, 2020, wherein it upheld the constitutional validity of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2020 (or Tribunal Rules 2020). Among other things, the decision is crucial for its observation on appointment of the Chairpersons, Vice-Chairperson and Technical Members to different tribunals including IPAB.
B. Top 10 Judgments/Orders [Jurisprudence/Legal Lucidity]
1. Interdigital Tech Corp & Ors. v. Xiaomi Corp & Ors. [Delhi High Court]
In a significant development, the Delhi High Court rejected InterDigital’s proposal for constituting a two-tier confidentiality club for sharing confidential documents to assess whether the licensing terms being offered by InterDigital were on FRAND basis. This proposal sought to exclude any representatives of parties, “other than “non-in-house” advocates and the experts appointed by them”, from accessing documents like “confidential, comparable patent license agreements on FRAND terms, as executed by the parties in the suit”. The court held such a proposal to be against fair play to the defendants and against the lawyer-client relationship.
2. Astrazeneca AB & Anr. v. Intas Pharma Ltd. & Alkem Labs Ltd. [Delhi High Court]
The Delhi High Court refused to grant an interim injunction for the manufacture of generic medicines whose subject matter was argued to be disclosed by a species patent, whereas they had already been covered in an expired genus patent. In this well-reasoned judgment, the court reiterated that there cannot be any dichotomy between disclosure and coverage. It also noted that owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, patients already suffering from diabetes are at a greater risk of contracting coronavirus and thus, affordable diabetes medication was in public interest. The court also clarified that disclosure requirements at the time of application had to be strictly followed by patent applicants.
3. Hindustan Unilever v. Endurance Domain and Ors. [Bombay High Court]
In a cybersquatting suit against various domain name registrars for using HUL’s trademark in domain names for fraudulent businesses, the Bombay High Court held that domain name registrars cannot be expected to ‘block access’ to a domain name, but can only be asked to temporarily suspend specific domain names. This provides clarity to the role and liability of domain name registrars in online trademark disputes.
4. Delhivery Private Ltd. v. Treasure Vase Ventures Private Ltd. [Delhi High Court]
The Delhi High Court held that the registered trademark ‘DELHIVERY’ is phonetically similar to the English word ‘delivery’ and is thus a generic mark, making it ineligible for trademark protection. It observed that only a generic mark which has achieved distinctiveness can enjoy trademark rights and refused to restrain the defendant from using the similar trademark ‘DELIVER-E’.
5. Vinay Vats v. Fox Star Studios India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. [Delhi High Court]
In a notable decision, the Delhi High Court refused to grant an interim injunction against the release of the movie Lootcase “twenty-four hours before it [was] due for release”. Here the injunction was sought based solely on a trailer released by the petitioner in 2011. The court, after noting the contested similarities between the two works, rightly highlighted that this “plot idea is as old as the hills” and that it was not the “exclusive province of the plaintiff”. It also came down heavily on the plaintiff for approaching it on the last minute and noted that there was “no justification for the plaintiff having approached this Court on the eve of the release of the film” and considered it an example of “misuse of the judicial process”.
6. Zee Entertainment Enterprises v. Ameya Vinod Khopkar & Ors. [Bombay High Court]
In yet another notable decision, the Bombay High Court refused to grant interim injunction sought by PLEX, a client-server media player that also provides services such as Live TV and free movies, against Zee’s recently launched a pay-per-view service, ZEEPLEX. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish its reputation within India as against the defendant’s greater reputation. It also noted the difference in the two services and the inability of the plaintiff to show any anticipated injury. Justice Patel also made a pertinent observation on the plaintiff moving the court at the last minute despite earlier knowledge of the incident. He stated that plaintiffs deliberately moving at the eleventh hour “must be prepared to face the consequences” for the same.
7. S.D. Containers Indore v. Mold Tek Packaging [Supreme Court]
In this judgment, the Supreme Court clarified that ‘High Court’ under Section 22(4) of the Design Act includes a High Court that does not have ordinary original civil jurisdiction. On the other hand, Section 7 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 only deals with High Courts having ordinary original civil jurisdiction. It also stated that in case of infringement suits under Section 22(4), the cause of action arises in the state where the suit had been initially filed and not the state where the designs are registered.
8. Zee Entertainment Enterprisesv.Ameya Vinod Khopkar & Ors.
In this case, the Plaintiff had been assigned the negative rights over the film ‘De Dhakka’ and thus sought to restrain the original creators from releasing a sequel of the film, ‘De Dhakka 2’. The Court refused to grant an ad-interim injunction, holding that the assignment deed pertained only to negative rights in the original film and prima facie did not transfer to them the right to make a sequel or a prequel. It also noted that the sequel in question has a completely different script, different dialogues, different concept, different characters and different locations and different music. The Plaintiff had also sued for infringement of the rights in the film title, but the court maintained, as per established jurisprudence, that the title of a work is not copyrightable.
9. Anil Rathi v. Shri Sharma Steeltech [Delhi High Court]
The Delhi High Court rejected the plea for the allowing the use of a surname-based mark, ‘RATHI’ in the course of trade because the usage of the trademark is regulated by a Memorandum of Understanding and a Trust Deed between the members of the Rathi Family to which the Defendant belongs. The court found that the Defendant’s act of issuing licenses in his personal capacity for the usage of impugned mark amounts to trademark infringement as such issuance is ultra vires the MoU and Trust Deed. It held that even though Section 35 of Trade Marks Act allows one to use a trademark based on their name, this is restricted to personal use of marks and does not to extend to the grant of licenses or use by artificial entities.
10. Novartis AG v. Controller of Patents [IPAB]
The IPAB quashed the revocation of Novartis’s patent on the anti-cancer drug Ceritinib by ruling that although the compound was contained in the markush claim of a broader genus patent, it was not ‘disclosed’ therein, as it hadn’t been specifically identified. This judgment helped shed light on the question of what constitutes disclosure, and held that generic disclosure of a chemical class did not take away the novelty of a specific compound within the class, unless the latter was ‘individualised’. It also clarified rules regarding filing of additional evidence for oppositions and reiterated the significance of adhering to statutory timelines.
C. Top 10 Legislative and Policy Developments
1. Govt published revised Form 27 (patent working statement)
After an enormous delay of almost two years, the Government finally published the revised version of the Form in October 2020, as part of the Patent (Amendment) Rules, 2020. The new Form has reinstated the requirement to state the reasons for not working the invention and steps being taken towards working the invention (with an arbitrary word limit of 500 words though) which was removed in the draft Form published in 2019. However, instead of seeking more elaborate details in respect of the information that the previous Form called for (as was suggested in Prof. Basheer’s PIL), it has done away with the requirement of submitting the following information which was sought by the previous Form:
- Quantum of the patented product manufactured in India or imported into India;
- Country wise details of the value and quantum of the patented product imported into India;
- The licenses and sub-licenses granted during the year; and
- Statement on whether public requirement has been met at a reasonable price.
2. Copyright Office sought comments from industry stakeholders on amendments to Copyright Act
The Copyright Office recently invited comments from industry stakeholders and law firms asking whether there was a need for amendments to be carried out to the Copyright Act. In this context, a group of ‘like minded IP teachers’ prepared a list of recommendations that focus on desirable public interest oriented amendments.
3. India and South Africa proposed waiver of key TRIPS provisions for Covid-19
India and South Africa issued a joint statement before the World Trade Organization for relaxation of certain TRIPS provisions in the wake of Covid-19. The rationale behind the proposal is to ensure accessibility of medicines and diagnostic products to cure the virus that might be hindered due to patent protections. Many countries might also face difficulty in using the TRIPS flexibilities. Additionally, for those countries lacking sufficient manufacturing capacity, the cumbersome process of Article 31bis of TRIPS is a cause of concern. Praharsh highlighted the issue of vaccine nationalism, given that as per manufacturing deals a large part of world’s population will not receive the vaccine till at least 2022. He pointed to the non ‘user friendly’ nature of Article 31bis for countries without manufacturing capacity. He notes that even a compulsory license would not suffice since trade secrets protections also come in the way. Moreover, effective technology transfer and know how sharing is important for which the developing countries are particularly not protected. This proposal was blocked at the WTO by High Income Countries.
4. IPAB to fix statutory licensing rate for radio broadcast royalties after 10 years
In this very significant development, IPAB passed an interim order maintaining the status quo of the royalty rate for radio broadcasts for statutory licenses under Section 31D of the Copyright Act. Subsequently, IPAB also issued a public notice inviting suggestions from stakeholders regarding fixing the royalty rates. The royalties had last been determined by the now-defunct Copyright Board in 2010, fixing them at a rate of 2% of the net advertisement revenues of the radio organizations from radio business, charged on a pro-rata basis. IPAB’s order fixing the rates, passed yesterday, can be viewed here.]
In February 2020, the Ministry of Corporate affairs came up with the draft Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2020, pursuant to the recommendations of Competition Law Review Committee. Among several other new provisions, the Bill proposed a new Section 4A. This was not a brand-new addition as such, as it extends the similar provision to Abuse of Dominance (AoD) cases that was hitherto applicable to anti-competitive agreements in the form of Section 3(5) as a ‘balancing’ provision. A closer look at the existing Section 3(5) or at the newly proposed Section 4A clarifies that it is not a blanket exemption to IP rights from the application of competition law as such, rather it is a declaration to affirm the right of an IP holder to safeguard her intellectual property. Vikas Kathuria argued on the blog that this seemingly benign declaration, however, may create new problems in the AoD cases related to intellectual property.
6. NDLI published a draft of India’s first copyright guide for Indian libraries
The National Digital Library of India (NDLI) came up with India’s first Copyright Guide for Indian Libraries. The stated objective of NDLI is to educate, enable and empower the youth using quality knowledge and learning resources while harnessing the power of the digital medium. The Guide was created, keeping in mind our current age where new technologies and gatekeepers of knowledge make it difficult for librarians to understand and deal with multiple issues pertaining to copyrights. It is a crisp 20 page document for public review and NDLI had invited feedback on it by 30th September, 2020 via a Google form. Overall, the Guide seems to have been drafted, keeping accessibility in mind. To that effect, it tried to simplify the complicatedly drafted provisions in the Indian Copyright Act pertaining to library exceptions. It purports to be a skeletal explanation of the law as it stands and the rights implicated in the functions of the library. Anupriya responded to some questions posed in the feedback questionnaire on the blog. She also argued that templates and declarations meant to scope permissible and impermissible uses, can contribute to a permissions and clearance culture that inevitably restricts fair dealing.
7. Govt axed Bt cotton licensing royalties paid by Indian seed companies to Bayer
Reuters reported that the Government of India “axed” the royalties that over 45 Indian seed companies had to pay Bayer (which acquired Monsanto) under IP licensing agreements which have been the centre of a massive legal dispute between Monsanto (before its acquisition by Bayer) and Nuziveedu (one of India’s biggest seed companies) for the last five years. For years, the Bt licensing agreements have earned Monsanto a fortune. Prashant wrote that this decision controls not only the retail price of cotton seeds, but also “trait fees” which cover ‘fee for patented technology, “know-how” and other services.’ He noted that though the ‘trait fees’ have consistently fallen over the past three years, its benefit has not been passed on to the farmers. Further, he suggested that the government’s decision may lead to more restrictive IP licensing agreements in the future. Analysing the government’s decision from a trade perspective, he noted the effect of suspension of U.S.’s GSP trading privileges on Indian industries. He concluded that a trade-off should ideally be between farmer incomes and incentivizing companies like Bayer to make their technologies available in India, rather than between profits of Indian seed companies and profits of MNCs.
8. As 15 Asia-Pacific countries signed RCEP, India chose to sit out.
In November 2020, ten south-east Asian countries along with Japan, China, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand signed the Agreement on Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), making it the world’s largest trade bloc. Initially projected as the alternative to Trans Pacific Partnership, the negotiations for this free trade agreement (FTA) were underway since 2012 and after 31 rounds, the member states finally sealed the deal via a video conference.The RCEP Agreement contains a dedicated chapter on prevention and enforcement of IP rights of the member states. Article 11.8 expressly declares that the Agreement shall not hinder the utilisation of Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement. India had withdrawn from the negotiations in November 2019 due to certain concerns. Regardless, RCEP members sent a formal statement showing willingness to commence negotiations with India even after the signing, provided India submits a written intention to accede to the RCEP Agreement. However, it doesn’t seem like India is eager to accede to the Agreement any time soon.
9. Controller General’s Office agreed with a petition for shutting down IPAB
In May 2020, Prashant Reddy and Rahul Bajaj had sent a petition to the Ministry of Commerce, asking it to consider shutting down the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). They had argued that not only was the IPAB non-functional for a long time but it was also poorly designed, especially with regard to the post of the ‘technical member’. Rather than continuing with this broken model, they recommended that the existing functions of the IPAB be shifted back to the High Courts and commercial courts. The Ministry of Commerce sent their petition to the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, asking for his comments on the petition. The Controller General’s office agreed with most of the contentions in the petition. Prashant noted on the blog that it was rare to see Indian bureaucrats speak in such categorically clear terms, in favour of reform.
10. Report on Non-Personal Data (NPD) Governance Framework released
The Committee of Experts on Non-Personal Data (NPD) Governance Framework, constituted by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology released its report on July 12, 2020. The Report purports to be a framework for governance of NPD, meant to grant access to NPD to industry players and the government for overarching public purposes. In order to increase the competitiveness of local and small enterprises and spur innovation, the Report is aimed at mandatory sharing of data to create economic advantages that are currently precluded due to data monopolies of a few dominant players. Anupriya examined on the blog, the government’s eminent domain powers against private entities’ right to IP, that arises in the case of data acquisition. The Committee has now revised the report and is seeking public feedback on it till January 27.
D. Top 10 Other IP Developments
1. Copyright infringement suit filed by academic publishers against Sci-Hub and Libgen
Three major academic publishers Elsevier Ltd. (UK), Wiley India, Wiley Periodicals (USA) and American Chemical Society (USA) have sued the websites ‘Sci-Hub’ and ‘Libgen’ before the Delhi High Court for infringing their copyright in their publications by making such publications available for free on these websites. They have sought for these websites to be blocked and a dynamic injunction issued against them. The matter is pending before the Court and is up for hearing on January 6, and in the meantime based on the defendant’s undertaking, the Court has instructed the defendants not to upload any new material of the plaintiffs.
Nikhil’s three-part post explaining the background of the case, analysing the plaintiffs’ dynamic injunction and the interim injunction plea, and the applicability of the fair dealing and educational use exceptions to the case, was also the most read copyright post on the blog in 2020.
2. Appointment of IPAB Chairperson/ Members
There were a lot of developments regarding appointments at the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) last year:
i) In March, the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (‘ACC’) notified the continuation of Justice (retd) Manmohan Singh as IPAB Chairperson until September 21, 2020.
ii) Then in July, the Indian Drug Manufacturer’s Association sued the Central Government over non-appointment of technical member for patent matters on the IPAB. Subsequently in August itself, the ACC notified the appointment of five technical members to the IPAB, including one for patent and two each for trademarks and copyright.
iii) Thereafter, in the same month the Department for Industry and Internal Trade called for applications for the post of the Chairperson of the IPAB, while an interim application for extension was filed in Supreme Court. The Chairperson’s tenure was further extended till December 31, 2020, by the Supreme Court.
iv) Finally, the most recent development concerning IPAB appointments is that the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2020.
3. Govt urged to revoke patent for Gilead’s potential anti-Covid drug Remdesivir
The Cancer Patients Aid Association (CPAA) had written to the Health Ministry and the Pharma Ministry urging them to revoke the Indian patent granted to Gilead’s Remdesivir, at a time where it was thought as a potential COVID-19 cure. The said petition invoked grounds of non-patentability and public interest. Interestingly, the WHO has recently issued a conditional recommendation against the use of Remdesivir for COVID-19 treatment.
4. IPRS’ new tariff scheme for live-streaming of online events and live/disc-jockey performances
The Indian Performing Right Society (IPRS) issued a notice regarding a tariff scheme to be made applicable for live-streaming and live/ disc-jockey performances. Upon receiving backlash from singers, musicians and popular press this scheme was put on hold. Subsequently, it was clarified that the released tariff scheme was only for engagement with stakeholders before its Annual General Meeting, and that it will not be applied unless it is approved.
5. AIDAN challenged Para 32 of Drug (Prices Control) Amendment Order, 2019
All Indian Drug Action Network (AIDAN) filed a petition before the Delhi High Court challenging Paragraph 32 of the Drug (Prices Control) Order 2013, which was amended through the Drug (Prices Control) Amendment Order, 2019. Paragraph 32 creates exemptions from price control, among which is one particular exemption for new drugs under the Patents Act, 1970, for five years from the date of commencement of the drug’s commercial marketing. However, it has been unclear whether this exemption is self-invocatory. As a result, several pharma companies were issued notices by the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority’s (NPPA) for relying on Paragraph 32 to exempt themselves from price caps without the authority’s approval, after having been granted patents. Subsequently, companies such as Lupin, Abbot Healthcare, Sun Pharma and Glenmark filed different petitions in High Courts concerning the interpretation of the exemptions granted under Para 32 and whether the same is self-invocatory.
6. India-Pakistan’s dispute over Basmati’s GI registration in the European Union
India had applied for protected geographical indication (PGI) status for Basmati before the European Commission. This application was published in September 2020 seeking objections if any against such registration. Earlier last month, Pakistan filed an opposition to India’s sole ownership of Basmati arguing that Basmati is a joint product of both countries. Interestingly, Basmati is yet to be given the GI status domestically in Pakistan.
7. RTI on Details of Patent Oppositions
Swaraj and Praharsh filed an RTI seeking information about the Annual Reports for 2018-19 and 2019-20 of the Office of Controller General of Patents. Using the response from the RTI and the publicly available reports, they tabulated statistics concerning pre-grant and post-grant oppositions from 2016-17 to 2019-20 which revealed a discrepancy in the numbers.
8. India ranked 40 out of 53 countries in the GIPC IP Index 2020
The 2020 edition of the GIPC IP was released. It ranked India at 40 out of the 53 countries considered by the index. It praised India on a few counts including calling it a “Global leader on targeted administrative incentives for the creation and use of IP assets for SMEs”.
9. Appeal filed before the Supreme Court in a PIL on access to legislations
A PIL was filed before the Delhi High Court seeking a direction from the High Court to mandate the Central Government to make hard copies of legislations available at a reasonable price. It claimed that publication of these laws by private publishers amounted to infringement of government’s copyright in them. The High Court denied to grant this relief and disposed off the petition. The petitioner filed an appeal against the said order before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had issued notice to the Union of India but the case has not yet come up for hearing.
10. Reverse engineering of Aarogya Setu mobile app initially prohibited
The terms of service of the Government’s Covid-19 tracking mobile app Aarogya Setu App imposed a blanket prohibition on reverse engineering, the legal enforceability of which was questioned by Aparajita in light of the fair use rights of users under Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. This prohibition was, however, subsequently lifted in an update to the terms of service of the app.